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1. INTRODUCTION
Is a comparison between European Union (E.U.) and U.S.
antitrust law of exclusive and restricted territorial distribution
beneficial, and if so, in what ways? The question necessarily
turns on the degree of feasibility of the comparison. If its
purpose is to compare the antithetical approaches adopted on
the two sides of the Atlantic and to suggest remedies designed
to cure the alleged flaws of the official positions taken in the
European Union by transferring there a series of insights
drawn from U.S. law, it certainly may not be pursued
independently of the prominent objectives of competition law
in the European Union. To many theorists, the "efficiency"
and "market power" approaches, largely endorsed in U.S. case
law and commentary, are attractive notions, useful for the
analysis of exclusive and vertical territorial arrangements in
both the United States and in Europe.' But the United States
"LL.B., University of Athens (1988); LL.M., University of Pennsylvania
Law School (1989); S.J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School,
"Alexander S. Onassis" Public Benefit Foundation Scholar (1994).
'Some ofthe criticism of current E.U. policies and restricted distribution
advanced by European commentators relies indirectly on economic ideas
reminiscent of the Chicago School analyses. See John S. Chard, The
Economics of Exclusive Distributorship Arrangements with Special Reference
to E.E.C. Competition Policy, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 405, 435 (1980); Ivo Van
Bael, Heretical Reflections on the Basic Dogma of E.E.C. Antitrust: Single
Market Integration, 10 REVUE SUISSE DU DROIT INT'L DE LA CONCURRENCE
39, 41-45 (1980). Other scholars, some of whom are affiliated with central
E.U. institutions, have also attempted to compare U.S. theories and case law
with E.U. doctrine, partly in order to propose solutions to the problems of
the latter. See RENt JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW:
AMERICAN, GERMAN AND COMMON MARKET LAWS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (1967) (pioneering book by a judge in the European Court of
Justice); Luc Gyselen, Vertical Restraints in the Distribution Process:
Strength and Weakness of the Free Rider Rationale Under EEC Competition
Law, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 647, 648-50 (1984) (an article by a member
of the DG-IV, the Directorate General of the European Commission
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is a fully integrated market, while the European Union
consists of twelve Member States striving to achieve
unification. As a result, the Member States are hostile to any
private arrangements that artificially perpetuate their
segregation. By the same token, proposals derived from U.S.
case law or literature may only be feasible if made in light of
(1) the basic statutory framework of the Treaty of Rome, and
most notably its provisions that are directly applicable in
restricted distribution disputes (i.e., the first and third
paragraphs of Article 85); (2) the allocation of the antitrust
enforcement duties between the European Commission, which
is given a central supervisory role on competition matters, and
the national judiciaries of the Member States; and (3) the
economic realities prevalent in the European market, that
often differentiate it from the more flexible and mobile U.S.
market.
This Article attempts an application of the neo-classical
price theory supported by advocates of the so-called Chicago
School in the E.U. law of exclusive distributorships and
concomitant territorial arrangements. To establish the
background for this transfer of ideas, Section 2 explores
whether the pursuit of "efficiency" in the exclusive distribution
and vertical territorial restriction context is in conflict with
the "market integration" goal of E.U. competition law. In
connection with this idea, "parallel imports" are a factor
involved in most exclusive and restricted distribution disputes,
and they contribute to the creation of a unified European
market. Section 3, after briefly referring to the general
requirements of Article 85 and commenting on the bifurcated
enforcement of its first and third paragraphs, outlines the
ways in which intrabrand competition and parallel imports are
protected by certain provisions and explanatory interpretations
of the Commission's Regulation No. 83/83, including a block
exemption of certain categories of exclusive distribution
arrangements. In addition, it includes a summary of some of
responsible for the enforcement of Competition Law). See also Barry E.
Hawk, The American (Anti-trust) Revolution: Lessons for the EEC?, 9 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REv. 53, 72 (1988). But see Michel Waelbroeck, Vertical
Agreements: Is the Commission Right Not to Follow the Current U.S.
Policy?, 25 SWISS REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 45, 52
(1985) (rejecting the application of U.S. policies in the European context).
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the leading decisions of the Commission and of the European
Court of Justice on exclusive and restricted territorial
distribution. Section 4 discusses the basic economics of
exclusive and restricted territorial distribution, identifies the
advantages of the "market power" and "efficiency" approaches
for both the competitive process and parties to exclusive
arrangements, and refers to decisions of U.S. courts, that
largely have embraced such approaches. Finally, Section 5
not only makes a proposal properly reconciled with the
"market integration" goal and designed for the future
resolution of exclusive distribution disputes while following
U.S. standards, but also suggests the amendment of the
current Regulation 83/83 during a transitional period. Section
5 also demonstrates the effects of the application of the
proposal in factual situations already faced by the European
Commission and the Court of Justice.
2. EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION AND Two DIVERGENT ANTITRUST
GOALS: EFFICIENCY AND EUROPEAN MARKET INTEGRATION
As a matter of principle, many antitrust theorists both
within the European Union and elsewhere embrace the
Chicago School neo-classical price theory and consider
efficiency the fundamental goal to be achieved in the market,
secured by competition and furthered by antitrust laws. An
efficient business practice is one that produces more aggregate
benefits than aggregate costs, thus resulting on balance in
maximized wealth. Efficiency is hence a purely economic
principle necessitating the allocation of all available market
resources in the best possible way, ultimately leading to an
increase in market output.' According to the principles of
2 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 90-106 (1978); A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (2d ed.
1989). Polinsky describes efficiency as an increase of aggregate benefits, no
matter how the benefits are distributed among members of the society.
Bork perceives efficiency in a somewhat different way. He distinguishes
between "allocative efficiency" and "productive efficiency." Defining the
former as the allocation of productive forces and materials of a market in a
way that consumers value most and the latter as the effective use of
resources of particular firms, he notes that the central antitrust objective
is, or at least should be, the improvement of allocative efficiency without an
impairment of productive efficiency. Bork thus introduces a certain
"distributional" dimension to the notion of efficiency. See also the
1994]
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the Chicago School theory, if individuals in business are
assumed to be profit-maximizers, they will make only rational
decisions, such as adopting vertical restrictions only for
efficiency purposes.' Further, assuming that the market is
self-correcting and punishes individuals who pursue inefficient
practices, the long-term survival of vertical or other practices
in a market suggests that- the latter actually enhance
efficiency. Therefore, "second guessing" and expanded
intervention by enforcement agencies and courts may only
create the risk of destroying efficient practices that are not
easily replaced.4
Despite the contention of many scholars that efficiency is
the emerging goal of E.U. competition law, it is beyond any
doubt that E.U. officials view European market integration
(i.e., the achievement of a truly unified European market) as
its most important objective, if not its raison d'etre.5 The
discussion by the Chicago and Harvard schools of thought on the efficient
aspects of some of the most commonly attacked -antitrust offenses, such as
restricted distribution and predatory pricing, in Frank H. Easterbrook,
Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696, 1700-01 (1986) and
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 938-44 (1979).
8 See Posner, supra note 2, at 928.
4 See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 1700-01. But see Eleanor M. Fox, The
Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a
Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 554, 580 (1986). The concept of self-correcting
markets is supplemented by some commentators with the utmost rejection
of the so-called "barriers to entry." New businesses are likely to enter
markets where supracompetitive profits are already being made without any
objective barrier making their projects infeasible or unworkable. Economies
of scale and advertising do not usually make the entry of firms into
industries difficult; rather, they are forms of superior efficiency of the firms
already competing. On the other hand, capital requirements and risk
premiums are not barriers to entry. Practically any firm may obtain capital,
make investments and start competing with firms that are already
established. Only in rare circumstances may scarce resources be such a
barrier. See generally BORK, supra note 2, at 310-29; Posner, supra note 2,
at 934-48.
' This is not to say that efficiency considerations are unknown in the
Union Competition Law. For example, antitrust scrutiny may be based on
efficiency considerations in relation to the third paragraph of Article 85 of
the Treaty of Rome, providing for the exemption of schemes violating the
first paragraph of the Article, as long as they contribute to the improvement
of production or distribution or promote technical or economic progress.
Some of the Reports of the European Commission on Competition Policy also
refer to efficiency. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
TWENTIETH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 11 (1991); The Community's
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realization of this political aim should not only be protected
against any adverse business practices, but actively promoted
by the E.U.'s competition policy. Aspects of this market
integration-oriented competition policy include: (1) abolition of
technical and business barriers partitioning the European
market along national lines; (2) prohibition of abuses of
dominant positions by powerful firms, which may stimulate
disparities among national markets; (3) promotion of trade
interpenetration of the markets of different Member States; (4)
protection of parallel imports; and (5) encouraging different
forms of cooperation between national small- and medium-
sized firms.6
Expressions of this ideal may be found in many official
documents of the European Union, including the Treaty of
Rome (such as Articles 2 and 3), the Reports on Competition
Policy of the European Commission, and the decisions of the
European Court of Justice.7
Competition Policy: Introduction to the First Report on Competition Policy,
5 BULL. OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES No. 5, at 19 (1972) [hereinafter First
Report].
' See generally Hawk, supra note 1, at 54, 56; Robert T. Jones, American
Anti-trust and EEC Competition Law in Comparative Perspective, 90 L. Q.
Rev. 191, 198-99 (1974); Valentine Korah, EEC Competition Policy-Legal
Form or Economic Efficiency, in 39 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1986 85, 89
(Roger Rideout & Jeffrey Jowell eds., 1986); James A. Rahl, Common Market
and European Antitrust Systems: An Overview, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 765, 772-
74 (1971); Van Bael, supra note 1, at 39.
' For example, Article 2 of the Treaty provides that the general goal of
the European Union is the establishment of a Common Market and the
approximation of economic activities of Member States, as well as the
achievement of closer relations between them. Article 3 outlines the means
by which the objectives in Article 2 may be achieved. The establishment of
a system that ensures that competition in the Common Market is not
distorted is one of those means. It is therefore understood that the
formulation of a workable competition policy must serve the goal of
European market unification. On the other hand, the Commission's Reports
on Competition Policy are particularly enlightening. See, e.g., First Report,
supra note 5, at 20 (stating that "the Community policy must avoid that
restraints and obstacles to trade by the state, which have been cut out, are
not replaced by private measures with similar effects. Quota agreements
and agreements which aim to carve the common market into regions ...
contravene the provisions of the Treaties."). See also NINTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 9 (1980) (condemning restrictive or abusive practices
that result in the partitioning of national markets); SIXTEENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 13-18 (1987) (same); EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 13-17 (1989) (providing that a national market-opening
policy prevails in competition matters); TWENTIETH REPORT ON COMPETITION
1994]
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Exclusive distribution controversies fit easily within this
context. A manufacturer entering into an exclusive supply
agreement8 with one of its distributors, i.e., agreeing to supply
only the latter in a clearly defined geographic area ("the
contract territory") and to refrain from selling the same
commodity for resale to other traders at the same level of
distribution, may want to reinforce the territorial exclusivity
of this distributor against incursions of traders operating in
adjacent areas. In order to accomplish this goal, the
manufacturer might impose on these traders- more or less
intense vertical territorial restrictions, prohibiting them from
engaging in out-of-territory sales9 and thus curtailing or even
eliminating intrabrand competition between them and the
exclusive distributor.10
In the European Union, exclusive distribution is usually
organized along national lines, and the contract territories
often coincide with national territories. Intrabrand
competition may thus develop among distributors of different
Member States. In such cases, cross-sales from one Member
State to another may take the form of "parallel imports,""
POLICY 11 (1991) (same).
' European legislative texts and case law use a variety of terms to refer
to these schemes. "Exclusive distributorship," "exclusive supply," and "sole
distributorship" are alternatively used in both the block exemption of
Regulation No. 83/83 and in decisions of the Commission and the European
Court of Justice. By contrast, U.S. judicial authorities occasionally refer to
such arrangements as "exclusive dealerships."
' For an analysis of the types of restrictions based on degree of
protection, see 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION I 1641b (1986), which refers
to areas of "primary responsibility" (merely obligating distributors to
concentrate their sales activity in a specific area to meet local demands), the
"location clause" (obligating dealers to sell from specific locations, but
permitting them to serve from there any customer they can reach), "airtight"
or "closed territories" (binding distributors not to sell actively outside their
prescribed areas or fill any orders from consumers based outside of them),
and "pass over payments" and "royalty systems" (commissions paid by
distributors for their out-of-territory sales to the "invaded" distributors or
to the manufacturer itself).
'o The term "intrabrand competition" designates the rivalry between
traders or resellers operating within the distribution network of a single
manufacturer's brand, in contrast to "interbrand competition," which occurs
between manufacturers producing or resellers distributing different brands.
" "Imports" refers to the circulation of goods or services from the
European country where they are originally produced or intended to be
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which contribute to the equalization of differentiated pricing
throughout the E.U. (due to the different tax systems, currency
exchange levels, costs of product promotion, consumer tastes,
and levels of distributor efficiency in the Member States),2
and in a sense promote European unification. Any adverse
involvement with such parallel imports by means of vertical
territorial restraints, which invigorate the exclusivity of
national distributors, thus prevent the equalization of prices
at a single level and consequently impede European
integration.
Significantly, both the provisions of the block exemption
included in Regulation No. 83/83 and the decisions of the
European Commission and the Court of Justice, discussed in
Section 3.2, demonstrate that whenever there is a conflict
between the pursuit of efficiency and market integration, E.U.
competition law opts for the latter. Because E.U. competition
policy is designed primarily to promote the unification of the
national markets of Member States, schemes contrary to that
goal are not tolerated, regardless of whether they yield output-
enhancing results or aim at efficiency. Because European
officials display such a strong hostility against exclusive
distribution agreements coupled with export or import
prohibitions, parallel imports become the essential factor that
each trader must take into account before entering into such
an agreement if it wishes to enjoy the blessings of the
Commission and avoid the prospect of subsequent illegality.
consumed to other Member States. The fact that the circulation of goods
must occur across national borders does not mean, however, that the goods
must be intended for use in the whole territory of importation. See SIMON
HORNER, PARALLEL IMPORTS 1 (1987). "Parallel imports" are made in
markets already served by traders supplying identical goods as importers
and are thus a form of intrabrand competition. For an analysis of parallel
imports as an expression of the free movement of goods within the Union,
especially in connection with Articles 12, 13 and 16 of the Treaty of Rome,
see id. at 118.
2 For an enumeration of factors contributing to differentiated national
price levels, see Waelbroeck, supra note 1, at 50.
1994]
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3. EXCLUSIVE AND RESTRICTED TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION IN
THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A BROAD
PROTECTION OF INTRABRAND COMPETITION AND PARALLEL
IMPORTS
3.1. The Legal Foundations for Exclusive and Restricted
Territory Distribution in the European Union: Article 85 of the
Treaty of Rome and Commission Regulation No. 83/83
The legal foundations of exclusive and vertical territorial
arrangements in the European Union are located primarily in
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome and in a specialized block
exemption issued by the European Commission for exclusive
distribution practices exhibiting specific characteristics. 3
The structure of Article 85 is divided. Its first paragraph
prohibits agreements and concerted practices that restrict
competition and affect interstate trade.'4  The second
"s See Commission Regulation 1983/83, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1.
14 See generally CHRISTOPHER W, BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD,
COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 246-74 (3d ed. 1987) (concerning the
application of 85(1) in exclusive distributorships); UTZ P. TOEPKE, EEC
COMPETITION LAW: BUSINESS ISSUES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN COMMON
MARKET ANTITRUST CASES 295-323 (1982) (same); RICHARD WHISH,
COMPETITION LAW 187-227 (3d ed. 1993) (same).
In the most common case, exclusive distributorships and vertical
territorial restrictions are agreements between two or more undertakings
(e.g., a manufacturer and a distributor or subsequent resellers in the
vertical chain of distribution). Under an alternative scenario, these
arrangements are established following a tacit understanding among those
parties. But see WILLY ALEXANDER, THE EEC RULES OF COMPETITION 71
(1973); JAMES P. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE E.E.C. 121-23
(1973); D.J. Gijlstra & D.F. Murphy, Distribution Systems and E.E.C.
Competition Law: The Law as it Stands, 1976/1 L.I.E.I. 89-92 (making it
clear that arrangements between a manufacturer and its agents are not
governed by 85(1)).
Moreover, the Commission and the European Court of Justice have
consistently taken the position that exclusive distributorships and vertical
territorial restrictions prevent, restrict and distort competition within the
European Union. Actually, the language of 85(1) does not make any
distinction between (1) various types of agreements that may distort
competition (e.g., horizontal, vertical, etc.); (2) different parties among which
competition may be restricted (e.g., parties to the agreements, third parties,
etc.); and (3) different forms of competition that may be suppressed (e.g.,
interbrand, intrabrand, etc.). See, e.g., Case 32/65, Italy v. Council and
Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 389, 407, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8048 (1966); Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements
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paragraph declares such agreements or concerted practices
void, while the third paragraph provides the Commission with
the discretion to make individual exemptions from the
prohibitions of the first paragraph, as long as the agreements
are beneficial and promote economic progress or otherwise
serve the legitimate business purposes of their parties.
3.1.1. Regulatory and Judicial Hints for a "Balanced"
Application of Article 85(1)
Although arrangements are traditionally governed by the
first paragraph of Article 85 without first being examined in
their appropriate legal and economic context, it has been
frequently stated that the European Commission and the
Court of Justice in several instances have acknowledged that
analysis under 85(1) should be more "balanced" and less
"automatic." Although Article 85(1), prima facie, seems to
establish a per se rule, i.e., a conclusive and non-rebuttable
presumption of illegality for agreements or concerted practices
falling under its provisions, the Commission and the Court of
Justice have allegedly created a set of presumptions that are
rebuttable on the basis of specifically required evidence,
factual indicia or market data. In addition, they have
allocated the burden of proof between plaintiffs and
defendants, leaving room for the examination of the pro- and
anticompetitive aspects of the challenged schemes.
The most acknowledged hints of such a "rule of reason"
inserted in the 85(1) jurisprudence are (1) the Commission's
Notice on Minor Agreements," declaring the inapplicability
Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 342.
Further, exclusive distributorships and vertical territorial arrangements
may have direct, indirect, actual, or probable effects on interstate trade.
This is foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability, as they may be
constructed between a manufacturer and its distributors operating in
different Member States, to which imports or from which exports are
restricted. See, e.g., id. at 341. On the repercussions of purely national
vertical schemes on inter-state trade, see the decisions of the Court of
Justice, such as Case 63/75, S.A. Fonderies Roubaix-Wattrelos v. Soci6t6
Nouvelle des Fonderies A. Roux and Soci6t6 des Fonderies JOT, 1976 E.C.R.
111, 119, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8341 (1976); Case 47/76, Alexis De
Norre v. NV Brouwerij Concordia, 1977 E.C.R. 65, 93, [1976 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8386 (1977).
" See Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, 1986 O.J.
(C 231) 2.
1994]
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of 85(1) to agreements and concerted practices of small- and
medium-sized undertakings, which, because of their minor
position in the market, will only restrict competition
insignificantly; (2) other de minimis considerations in the
evaluation of contested vertical practices that are judged
outside the scope of 85(1) as adopted by parties with small
market shares; 6 (3) the occasional development of judicial
criteria for a "balanced" application of 85(1);1" and (4) the
adoption, especially in some dicta of the European Court of
Justice, of an "ancillary restraint" approach.'"
Nonetheless, it is generally true that such "rule of reason"
indicators are limited in scope (as exhibited in the Notice on
Minor Agreements and in the decisions involving de minimis
s See, e.g., Case 5/69, Volk v. Etablissements J. Vervaecke, 1969 E.C.R.
295, 303, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8074
(1969); Case 1/71, S.A. Cadillon v. Hess, 1971 E.C.R. 351, 356, [1971-1973
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8135 (1971).
"7 See, e.g., Case 56/65, Soci~t6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm
GmbH, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 250, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8047 (1966) (deciding the applicability of 85(1) upon
consideration of the following factors: a) the nature and quantity of the
product covered by a contested agreement, b) the position and strength of
the parties to the agreement in the relevant product and geographic market,
c) the isolated nature of the disputed agreement, or, alternatively, its
position in a series of (similar) agreements, and d) the severity of the
particular restrictions provided in its clauses); Case C-234189, Delimitis v.
Henninger Brau, 1991 E.C.R. 935, 5 C.M.L.R. 210 (1992), [1992] 2 CEC
(CCH) 530, 535 (enumerating the factors that must be given particular
weight in exclusive purchasing controversies); Valentine Korah, The
Judgment in Delimitis: A Milestone Towards a Realistic Assessment of the
Effects of an Agreement--or a Damp Squib?, 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 167,
172 (1992); K.P.E. Lasok, Assessing the Economic Consequences of
Restrictive Agreements: A Comment on the Delimitis Case, 12 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 194, 196, 199 (1991).
1" Thus, restrictions considered necessary for a legitimate business
purpose, be it the protection of know-how of a franchisor against
exploitation by competitors, the preservation of the identity or reputation
of a franchise network, the continuity of supplies attributed to clauses of an
exclusive purchasing agreement, or the protection of interests of purchasers
in avoiding competition from sellers for a minimum period of time (which
might be achieved through the insertion of a non-competition clause in a
sales agreement), have been found not to violate 85(1). See, e.g., Case 161/
84, Pronuptia v. Schillgalis, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 1 C.M.L.R. 414 (1986);
Commission Decision Re the Agreements of Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia
NV, 2 C.M.L.R. 165, 174 (1984); Commission Decision Atka A/S v. BP Kemi
A/S, 1979 O.J. (L 286) 32, 42, 43, 3 C.M.L.R. 684, 702, 703 (1979).
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arrangements)" or in subject matter (as in the "ancillary
restraint" approach), 0 or that they are not incorporated
effectively in the whole body of E.U. competition case law.
3.1.2. The Third Paragraph of Article 85 and the Exclusive
Power of the Commission to Apply It
An exclusive or vertical territorial arrangement falling
under 85(1) might be granted an individual exemption under
85(3) if properly notified to the Commission by interested
parties,2 who must prove that such an arrangement effects
an improvement in production or distribution or that it
contributes to technical or economic progress. Further, parties
must provide evidence that the notified arrangement is
indispensable for this improvement in production or
distribution or for the technical or economic progress. If these
alleged beneficial results may be objectively accomplished with
fewer restrictions on competition, exclusive or other vertical
practices may not benefit from the advantages of 85(3).
Similarly, it must be demonstrated that ultimate consumers
will be allowed to enjoy a "fair share" of the benefits of the
notified agreements.
Ultimately, however, the power to apply the third
paragraph of Article 85 and to grant exemptions for exclusive
and vertical territorial arrangements is at the discretion of the
Commission, and more specifically its Directorate General
(DG)-IV.22 This exclusive power initially was given to the
Commission to enable it to formulate particular uniform rules
'9 Thus, agreements even slightly exceedingthe market share percentage
prescribed by the Notice (5%) automatically fall under 85(1). Similarly, the
"de minimis" considerations are mostly confined to cases where defendant
parties occupy only minimal shares (less than 1% of the relevant market).
2 For example, the "ancillary restraint" doctrine has been consistently
applied only for these specific categories of arrangements, and only to serve
its original purpose as pronounced by the European judicial authorities (e.g.,
protection of know-how in franchise agreements, etc.), while other practices
designed to serve different purposes have been analyzed with much greater
skepticism and eventually have been outlawed. See infra notes 45-46
(decisions of the Commission and the European Court of Justice in which
vertical territorial schemes have been condemned without regard to their
procompetitive justifications).
" See Council Regulation 17/62, 1959 O.J. (L 62) 87 (the first Regulation
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome).
22 Id art. 9(1).
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and approaches in E.U. competition law, thereby giving
guidance to businesses as to which of their practices are legal
and which violate the legal order of the E.U.." It soon
became evident, however, that its limited staff was
consistently unable to cope effectively and within reasonable
time limits with all the notifications that reached its Brussels
headquarters. In the absence of any kind of interlocutory
relief or provisional validity until a formal exemption is
granted,2 4 businesses wishing to draft their arrangements in
a manner different from that provided in the block exemption
on exclusive distribution face considerable delays and
uncertainty. As a result, they frequently included clauses of
dubious legality in their agreements, some of which were
annulled by the Commission. This deterred some businesses
from using such clauses, despite the fact that the clauses may
have been procompetitive and beneficial.25
3.2. The Block Exemption of Regulation No. 83/83 and its
Safeguards Against National Market Isolation
Regulation No. 83/83, which is currently in effect and
provides for the block exemption of exclusive distribution
2 See Ian Forrester & Christopher Norall, The Laicization of Community
Law: Self-Help and the Rule of Reason: How Competition Law Is and
Could Be Applied, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 11, 22 (1984); James S. Venit,
Slouching Towards Bethlehem: The Role of Reason and Notification in EEC
Antitrust Law, 10 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 17, 19 (1987).
24 See Valentine Korah, The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity-the
Need for a Rule of Reason in EEC Antitrust, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 320,
350 (1981).
2 Many European scholars have heavily criticized the exclusive power
of the Commission to grant exemptions, and have proposed solutions
ranging from favoring a rule of reason under 85(1) to suggesting that
national courts be able to grant exemptions under 85(3). See Forrester &
Norall, supra note 23, at 38-45; JOLIET, supra note 1, at 115; Stephen Kon,
Article 85, Para. 3: A Case For Application By National Courts, 19 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 541, 554-61 (1982); Korah, supra note 24, at 350-55; Mark
Clifford Schechter, The Rule of Reason in European Competition Law, 1982/
2 L.I.E.I. 1, 2, 13-15; Ernst Steindorff, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, 21
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 639, 646 (1984); Helmuth R.B. Schroter, Antitrust
Analysis Under Article 85(1) and (3), 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 645,
690-92; Venit, supra note 23, at 33-51; see also unpublished notes from a
lecture by Professor Korah on exclusive distribution, given at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School on February 21, 1994, at 18 (on file with
author).
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arrangements with specifically defined characteristics, is an
amendment of Regulation No. 67/67, which was issued after an
era during which cases of exclusivity in distribution were only
exempted individually under 85(3) following notifications by
interested parties to the Commission.2" Although Regulation
No. 83/83 maintains most of the provisions of Regulation No.
67/67, it also includes some additions designed to circumvent
the risk that the exempted arrangements would serve purposes
of national market sharing. 7
3.2.1. Raison d'6tre and the Limits of Exclusive
Distribution
The block exemption of Regulation No. 83/83 covers
"bilateral"'8 agreements between a manufacturer and a single
"' See, e.g., Commission Decision, Maison Jallatte, 1966 J.O. (3) 37, 1
C.M.L.R. D1 (1966) (presenting similar facts and reasoning, and granting
exemptions under 85(3)); Commission Decision Hummel-Isbecque, 1965 J.O.
(156) 2581, 1 C.M.L.R. 242 (1965) (same); Commission Decision Re Blondel's
Agreement, 1965 J.O. (141) 2194, 1 C.M.L.R. 180 (1965) (same).
27 See, e.g., Commission Regulation 83/83, art. 3(c) (including a provision
to ensure that end users in every Member State have an alternative
intrabrand source of supply outside the Member State); Commission
Regulation 83/83, art. 6 (providing for the discretion of the Commission to
withdraw the benefit of the block exemption if parallel imports are made
impossible for reasons other than those included in Article 3). Useful
comments and analyses on the provisions of this Regulation can be found
mainly in VALENTINE KORAH, EXCLUsIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS IN THE
E.E.C.: REGULATION 67/67 REPLACED (1st ed. 1984); VALENTINE KORAH &
WARWICKA. ROTRNIE, ExcLusIvE DISTRIBUTION AND THE EEC COMPETITION
RULES: REGULATIONS 1983/83 & 1984/83 (2d ed. 1992); Helmuth Lutz &
Terry R. Broderick, E.E.C. Agreements for Exclusive Distribution and
Purchasing, 14 INT'L Bus. L. 162 (1986); William T. McGrath, Group
Exemptions for Exclusive Distribution Agreements in the Common Market,
9 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 231 (1984); Utz Toepke, EEC Law of
Competition: Distribution Agreements and Their Notification, 19 INT'L LAW
117 (1985); Floris O.W. Vogelaar, The Overall Policy of the Commission
Concerning Distribution in the Light of Recent Developments, 1986 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 185.
28 The first condition refers to the number of undertakings which are
parties to the agreement. It is intended to discourage the use of exclusive
distribution schemes as a means of establishing or maintaining cartels
among competing distributors. A manufacturer appointing multiple
exclusive distributors with a single contract might apply identical terms of
sale to all of them, and thus indirectly facilitate their collusion. See
Helmuth R. B. Schr6ter, The Application of Article 85 of the EEC 73-eaty to
Distribution Agreements-Principles and Recent Developments, 1984
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 375, 398.
1994]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
distributor, granting the distributor exclusive "resale"
rights to the manufacturer's "goods."3" The Preamble to the
Regulation recognizes that exclusive supply agreements help
improve and rationalize distribution networks and are often
the only way for small- or medium-sized undertakings to enter
new markets."' These agreements facilitate the promotion
and intensive marketing of products within specific areas. If
the agreements are used to eliminate intrabrand competition
between exclusive distributors or exclusive supply or parallel
imports from one national market to another, consumers may
be deprived of their "fair share" of the improvements in
distribution through lower resale prices, and, as a result, the
block exemption will become inapplicable or will be withdrawn.
Exclusive arrangements reinforced with intense vertical
territorial restraints that shield distributors from such
extraterritorial competition do not meet the specifications set
forth in Regulation No. 83/83. According to its underlying
philosophy, the regulation seeks to avoid the evil of
compartmentalized national markets at the intrabrand
level.3"
29 By contrast, transformation or further processing of the
manufacturer's product is not covered by the Regulation. The exclusive
distributor may, however, repackage those goods according to packaging
specifications prevalent in other countries in order to export them there
eventually. See Commission's Explanatory Memorandum (commonly
referred to as "the Guidelines"): "The economic identity of the goods is not
affected if the reseller merely breaks up and packs the goods into other
packages before resale." 1983 O.J. (C 355) 7, 8.
so But see Guideline 11, which states: "Exclusive agreements for the
supply of services rather than the resale of goods are not covered by the
Regulations." Id at 8. See also BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON
MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 444, 445 (1990).
"I See Recital 6 to Regulation 83/83, 1983 O.J. (L 173) at 1. The Recital
provides:
[E]xclusive distribution agreements facilitate the promotion of sales of a
product and lead to intensive marketing and to continuity of supplies while
at the same time rationalizing distribution; ... they [also] stimulate
competition between the products of different manufacturers.... [T]he
appointment of an exclusive distributor who will take over sales promotion,
customer services and carrying of stocks is often the most effective way, and
sometimes indeed the only way, for the manufacturer to enter a market and
compete with other manufacturers already present .... [T]his is
particularly so in the case of small and medium-sized undertakings.
Id.
32 See id. at 2 (providing that "[clonsumers will be assured of a fair share
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3.2.2. Protection of Intrabrand Competition and Parallel
Imports Under Regulation 83/83
Many of Regulation 83/83's provisions emphasize its most
prominent characteristic: the condemnation of intense vertical
restrictions amounting to the absolute territorial protection of
national exclusive distributors, which leads to the
compartmentalization of national markets. Parallel imports
must remain viable and intrabrand competition among traders
from different Member States must flourish to make possible
the development of interstate trade and the achievement of a
unified Europe. The following is a summary of those
provisions of Regulation 83/83 and of the Commission's
Explanatory Memorandum which directly or indirectly
safeguard the unification of European markets and protect the
so-called "fair share" interests of European consumers:
1) Point 27 of the Guidelines, interpreting Article 1 of the
Regulation, defines the limits of "exclusive supply." It
provides that the supplier remains free to sell the contract
good to resellers outside the territory who later intend to
sell within it, thus creating an alternative source of supply
for consumers. It also fosters rivalry at the intrabrand
level and, frequently, among parallel imports, where
exclusivity is granted along national lines. As a result, the
exclusive distributor might occasionally be undercut by
resellers from outside the territory."3
of the benefits resulting from exclusive distribution only if parallel imports
remain possible.... [A]greements relating to goods which the user can
obtain only from the exclusive distributor should therefore be excluded from
the exemption by category.").
The manipulation of exclusive schemes in order to eliminate competition
at the interbrand level similarly is condemned. Competing manufacturers
appointing each other as their exclusive distributors may not benefit from
the advantages of the block exemption. See, e.g., art. 3(a) and (b), i& at 3
(prohibiting reciprocal and non-reciprocal exclusive agreements among
competing manufacturers); art. 4, id. (extending the prohibition to
undertakings simply "connected" with the manufacturers-parties to the
agreements); see also KORAH, supra note 27, at 19; KoRAH & RoTHNIE, supra
note 27, at 130-35.
S Guideline 27 provides that "[t]he exclusive supply obligation does not
prevent the supplier from providing the contract goods to other resellers
who afterwards sell them in the exclusive distributor's territory." 1983 O.J.
(C 355) 7, 10. Guideline 27 contradicts Guideline 28, which states that
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2) Guideline 30 gives the manufacturer, as intrabrand
competitor of the exclusive distributor, discretion to supply
to certain final consumers or end users who buy its goods
outside the contract territory but are permanently based in
it. 4 Thus, the exclusive distributor is truly exclusive only
as long as its supplier has decided not to compete with it
for the patronage of the same customers.
3) Article 2(1) of the Regulation indicates that the supplier
may not bear any obligations toward the exclusive
distributor other than those referred to in Article 1. It
thus implies that the supplier may not prohibit other
distributors in its network from engaging in parallel
imports or from invading the exclusive distributor's
territory when this territory coincides with a Member
State.35
4) Guideline 28 qualifies the limited territorial protection
granted to the distributor in Article 2(2)(c), by stating that
although the exclusive distributor may not engage in active
sales outside its contract area, it may still accept and fill
orders from customers residing in other territories. Again,
the provision seeks to preserve parallel trade and
intrabrand competition among exclusive distributors, who
have the opportunity to sell in other areas.3"
5) Both Guideline 17 and Recital 8 of the Preamble to the
regulation state that exclusive distributors may not accept
any further restrictive obligations that would limit their
"resale" by the exclusive distributor has to take place within the contract
territory. Id. If the manufacturer supplies one of its exclusive distributors
wishing to resell in another distributor's territory, its practice conforms with
Guideline 27, but not with Guideline 28. See KORAH, supra note 27, at 14,
15.
-4 1983 O.J. (C 355) 7, 11. Guideline 30 provides that "[t]he supplier
remains free to supply the contract goods outside the contract territory to
final users based in the territory." Id.; see also KORAH, supra note 27, at 14;
KoRAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at 101.
" See KORAH, supra note 27, at 15; KORAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at
101.
" Guideline 28 provides that "[u]nder Article 2(2)(c), the supplier can
prohibit him [the exclusive distributor] only from seeking customers in other
areas, but not from supplying them." 1983 O.J. (C 355) 7, 10. See also
KORAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at 105; Valentine Korah, Group
Exemptions For Exclusive Distribution and Purchasing in the E.E.C., 21
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 53, 78 (1984).
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freedom to determine prices, other conditions of sale, or
customers. For example, distributors may not agree with
their suppliers to respect resale price maintenance schemes
or customer restrictions. Such schemes are occasionally
used to protect the territory of distributors, either by
making uneconomical sales or parallel imports or by
banning sales to customers outside the contract area. By
forbidding manufacturers to impose such restrictions on
their exclusive distributors, Guideline 17 and Recital 8
deprive manufacturers of a possible method of controlling
cross-trade between contract territories and contribute to
the preservation of intrabrand competition among these
exclusive distributors.
6) Guideline 9 broadly defines the term "resale" to include the
repackaging of contract goods by the exclusive distributor.
The exclusive distributor is free to purchase the contract
good and to alter its package so that it conforms to the
requirements of territories or Member States where other
distributors are appointed and to sell or export it to those
territories. Fostering intrabrand competition thus helps
foil attempts of distributors to retain among themselves the
markets of the different Member States.3"
7) Article 3(c) condemns the block exemption and declares it
inapplicable to exclusive distribution agreements where
37 1983 O.J. (C 355) 7, 9 (Guideline 17); 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1, 2 (Recital
8). "[F]urther restrictive obligations and in particular those which limit the
exclusive distributor's choice of customers or his freedom to determine his
prices and conditions of sale cannot be exempted under this Regulation."
1983 O.J. (L 173) 1, 2. "Apart from the exclusive supply obligation...,
obligations defined in Article 1... must be present if the block exemption
is to apply, the only other restrictions on competition that may be agreed by
the parties are those set out in Article 2(1) and (2)." 1983 O.J. (C 355) 7, 9;
see also KORAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at 116, 117.
38 See Guideline 9, 1983 O.J. (C 355) at 7, 8; see also Case 102127,
Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. v. Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, 3 C.M.L.R. 217,
249 (1978) (third party may repackage goods, but proprietor of the
trademark right of the goods may prevent their marketing in another
Member State). But see C.W.F. Baden Fuller, Economic Issues Relating to
Property Rights in Trademarks: Export Bans, Differential Pricing,
Restrictions on Resale and Repackaging, 1981 EUR. L. REV. 162, 176-78
(criticizing this decision and arguing that the curtailment of intrabrand
competition achieved by the imposition of post-sale restrictions on
repackaging or relabelling may serve the lawful purpose of promoting
interbrand rivalry between different manufacturers of comparable goods).
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end users can obtain contract goods only from the exclusive
distributor, with no recourse to any alternative suppliers
outside the contract territory or outside their Member
State in the form of parallel imports. As explained in the
preamble to the regulation, customers must be able to
obtain a fair share of the benefits achieved through the
exclusive distribution scheme, such as better service,
effective marketing of products, rationalization of
distribution, and advance planning of production, at lower
prices. The Commission was concerned that without
alternative suppliers, exclusive distributors would charge
supracompetitive prices and impose unfavorable conditions
of sale on their customers. As most of the consumers
would be price-motivated, the exclusive scheme would be to
their detriment."9 Intrabrand competition, on the other
hand, will lead to lower prices. Article 3(c) also provides a
safeguard for parallel imports in cases in which the
contract territory consists of a whole Member State and the
alternative sources of supply originate outside the state in
the form of imports.4"
8) Article 3(d) also condemns obstructions of parallel imports
through the institution of exclusive schemes, but it
pertains to exclusive distributorships in which contract
goods can circulate to the ultimate consumers through
intermediaries, and where the lack of alternative suppliers
is due to either the unilateral or bilateral4 actions of the
See Recital 11, 1983 O.J. (L 173) at 2.
40 See art. 3(c), 1983 O.J. (L 173) at 3 (providing that Article 1 shall not
apply where users can obtain the contract goods in the contract territory
only from the exclusive distributor and have no alternative supplier outside
the contract territory).
This paragraph of Article 3 apparently refers to situations in which the
exclusive distributor sells the contract goods directly to final consumers or
users and the lack of alternative suppliers is due to external factors and not
to unilateral or concerted practices of the parties to the exclusive agreement.
See Schroter, supra note 28, at 405.
4, See art. 3(d), 1983 O.J. (L 173) at 3. Art. 3(d) provides that:
Article I shall not apply where:
d) one or both parties make[] it difficult for intermediaries or users to obtain
the contract goods from other dealers inside the common market, or, in so
far as no alternative source of supply is available there, from outside the
common market, in particular where one or both of them:
1. exercises industrial property rights so as to prevent dealers or users
from obtaining outside, or from sellingin, the contract territory properly
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parties to the exclusive agreement.
9) Finally, Article 6(c) provides that the Commission can
withdraw the block exemption for an exclusive
distributorship where intrabrand competition or parallel
imports (or both) are not possible at terms customary in
the contract territory or for reasons not covered by Article
3(c) and (d).4"
What is remarkable in those provisions and explanatory
guidelines, however, is the total absence of market analysis
and an overemphasis on the Commission's interest in unifying
national markets through parallel imports and intrabrand
competition, even when the competition originates from the
manufacturer or from other distributors. What matters is that
they all contribute to the equalization of prices between
different distributor contract territories and, eventually, in the
whole European Union. The Commission is content to outlaw
any exclusive scheme not conforming to those conditions.
Unfortunately, it fails to consider a number of factors that
place intrabrand restrictions and the limitation of parallel
imports in their correct market context.
First, the aforementioned provisions of the Regulation
and the interpretative comments of the Guidelines make the
legality of exclusive distributorships depend on the existence
marked or otherwise properly marketed contract goods;
2. exercises other rights or take other measures so as to prevent dealers
or users from obtaining outside, or from selling in, the contract territory
contract goods.
Id.
The fact that the application of Article 3(d) is triggered not only in
situations where intrabrand competition or parallel imports are impeded as
a result of concerted actions by the manufacturer and the exclusive
distributor, but also because of unilateral actions by one of the parties, has
been criticized.
42 See art. 6(c), 1983 O.J. (L 173) at 4 (providing that "[t]he Commission
may withdraw the benefit of this Regulation,... in particular where ... for
reasons other than those referred to in Article 3(c) and (d) it is not possible
for intermediaries or users to obtain supplies of the contract goods from
dealers outside the contract territory on terms there customary").
The Commission will apply 6(c) and withdraw the block exemption only
in cases in which external factors, such as independent action of third
parties in other territories or local market conditions (not caused by the
behavior of the parties to the exclusive agreement), do not completely
impede intrabrand competition or parallel imports, but simply dictate prices
and terms of sale unfavorable to customers in the contract territory.
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of alternative sources of supply and on the absence of absolute
territorial protection of the distributors. No reference is made
to more general market conditions, such as market structure,
the number of competing manufacturers in the contract
territory, or the vigor of interbrand competition. Considering
that consumers will obtain a fair share of the improvements in
distribution only if rivalry at the intrabrand level remains
unfettered, the provisions fail to give proper weight to
interbrand competition as a balancing factor for any
intrabrand restriction.
Second, the Commission does not distinguish between
situations in which the absolute territorial protection of the
exclusive distributors reflects the will of the manufacturer,
and those merely resulting from an express or implied
agreement of exclusive distributors who aim to share
territories or national markets among themselves and
discourage competition.
Third, because the Commission makes no such distinction,
the provisions allow this protection to be independently
granted by the manufacturer in order to enhance the
competitiveness of its product. Such a manufacturer may, for
example, improve the competitive status of its product by
restricting its channels of distribution.
Given the strictness of the provisions regarding absolute
territorial protection of distributors and the absence of any
mitigating grounds for lifting it, "exclusivity" takes on a new
meaning. On the one hand, a trader appointed by a
manufacturer as its sole distributor within a territory bears all
the risks and expenses related to product promotion and
customer satisfaction. On the other hand, the block exemption
provided by Regulation No. 83/83 will not apply without the
existence of alternative sources of supply-such as other
distributors, resellers, or even the manufacturer-in the
territory.
3.3. Exclusive Distribution and Vertical Territorial
Restrictions in E. U. Case Law
3.3.1. The Typical Scenario: Infringement of Article 85(1)
and Refusal to Grant Exemption Under Article 85(3)
Parties to an exclusive distribution arrangement not
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covered by Regulation 83/83 may only obtain an individual
exemption under Article 85(3). In most cases, parties seek
exemption from the absolute territorial protection of exclusive
distributors. Through a variety of practices, manufacturers
wishing to control their distribution networks may explicitly
or tacitly agree with their distributors to protect them from
territorial incursions by intrabrand competitors. Apart from
direct import and export bans, parties may ban horizontal
supplies, use trademark rights, control the price mechanism,
use dual pricing, establish a selective distribution system, or
selectively grant guarantee rights to consumers, either to
discourage parallel imports or to make them uneconomical.43
Both the Commission and the Court of Justice unanimously
condemn each of these practices using the following reasoning.
Initially, they find that Article 85(1) applies because these
practices restrict competition and negatively affect trade
between Member States. In most situations, contested
practices or agreements are automatically caught by 85(1),
without first being examined in their appropriate economic
and legal market context and without regard to the market
position of the manufacturer adopting them. As long as the
manufacturer's share in the relevant market is greater than
five percent, competition is considered to be "appreciably"
restricted.44
The Commission and the Court of Justice then refuse to
apply 85(3) because most of its criteria are not met; absolute
territorial protection schemes run contrary to the goal of
European market integration. Even if there is an
improvement in distribution, they hold that the direct or
indirect impediment to parallel imports denies European
consumers a fair share of these improvements in the form of
lower prices. Moreover, they hold that the "indispensability"
test is not met, and no improvement in distribution is
considered important enough to justify the prevention of
parallel imports. In the view of the Commission and the Court
' A more detailed discussion of each of these practices appears later in
this section. See infra sections 3.3.3-3.3.8.
"" See Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, 1986 O.J.
(C 231) 2, 2-3. Even market shares that slightly exceed the levels specified
by the Notice are caught by 85(1). See supra notes 15, 18, and 19, and
accompanying text.
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of Justice, there are always less restrictive methods to achieve
the same result.
3.3.2. Direct Export Bans in the Miller Decision
Export bans, although the most effective means of
controlling both intrabrand competition within distribution
networks and parallel imports from one Member State to
another, are seldom used because of the marked hostility that
both the Commission and the Court of Justice show to
them.45 The Miller case,4" decided by the Court of Justice
on appeal of a Commission decision that condemned an
agreement because it provided for direct export bans,
exemplifies the way in which Article 85(1) is applied in
practice.
Miller International Schallplatten GmbH (Miller), a
German manufacturer of music records and tapes, appointed
two exclusive distributors, one for the French province of
Alsace-Lorraine, and one for the Netherlands. It then imposed
4' Among the most significant decisions of the Commission involving
export bans are: Commission Decision 85/617, Sperry New Holland, 1985
O.J. (L 376) 21,26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,749 (1985); Commission
Decision 84/282, Polistil/Arbois, 1984 O.J. (L 136) 9, 2 C.M.L.R. 594, 598,
599 (1984), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,587 (1984); Commission Decision
82/367, Hasselblad (BG) Ltd., 1982 O.J. (L 161) 18, 2 C.M.L.R. 233, 251
(1982), on appeal, Case 86/82 Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Commission, 1984
E.C.R. 883, 1 C.M.L.R. 559 (1984); Commission Decision 83/203, Mobt et
Chandon Ltd., 1982 O.J. (L 94) 7, 2 C.M.L.R. 166, 168 (1982), Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 1 10,352 (1982); Commission Decision 80/1283, Johnson &
Johnson, 1980 O.J. (L 377) 16, 23, 2 C.M.L.R. 287 (1980), Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 1 10,277 (1980); Commission Decision 75/94, Re the Application
of Goodyear Italiana SpA, 1975 O.J. (L 38) 10, 1 C.M.L.R. D31, 34 (1975);
Commission Decision 73/322, Re Deutsche Philips GmbH, 1973 O.J. (L 293)
40, C.M.L.R. D241, 243, 245 (1973); Commission Decision 73/196, DuPont
de Nemours Germany, 1973 O.J. (L 194) 27, C.M.L.R. D226, 229 (1973);
Commission Decision 72/480, WEA-Filippachi Music SA, 1972 J.O. (L 303)
52, 53; see also Commission Decision 92/426, Viho Europe BV v. Parker Pen
Ltd., 1992 O.J. (L 233) 27, 30 (manufacturers refused to supply traders who
would later be engaged in parallel exports); Commission Decision 92/261,
Newitt &Co. Ltd. v. Dunlop Slazenger Intl, Ltd., 1992 O.J. (L 131) 32, 35,
40 (same); Commission Decision 87/406, Re Tipp-Ex Vertrieb GmbH & Co.
KG, 1987 O.J. (L 222) 1, 3, 8 (distributors prohibited both from selling
outside their contract territory directly and from selling to local customers
who themselves planned to sell elsewhere).
4 Case 19/77, Miller Intl Schallplatten GmbH v. Commission, 1978
E.C.R. 131, 2 C.M.L.R. 334 (1978), Common Mkt. Rep. (C.C.H.) 9 8,439
(1978).
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on these distributors-as well as on all of its wholesalers and
retailers in Germany-the obligation to refrain from exporting
to other countries. After determining that Miller's market
share was between 4.91% and 6.07% (not a negligible
percentage) the Court concluded that through its export bans,
Miller could negatively influence intrabrand competition,
parallel imports, and interstate trade to an appreciable degree.
Applying Article 85(1), the Court fined Miller and ordered an
end to its alleged infringement. 4 7
3.3.3. Prohibitions on Horizontal Supplies and the GERO-
fabriek Decision
Bans on horizontal supplies involve a prohibition of cross-
supplies among distributors operating at the same level of a
manufacturer's network, rather than a prohibition on
distributors' sales to end-consumers or to traders of
subsequent levels. In GERO-fabriek, s a Dutch cutlery
manufacturer prohibited its retailers from selling to other
retailers within the Netherlands and from selling at all outside
the country. GERO-fabriek had also appointed an exclusive
distributor in Belgium, which in turn sold to several retailers.
The combination of these two arrangements effectively
prevented Belgian dealers from supplementing their stocks if
they became depleted.
Without taking into account GERO-fabriek's market
position or the strength of competition among cutlery
producers in the Belgian market, the Commission stated that
Article 85(1) was applicable. The Commission reasoned that
by preventing Dutch retailers from supplying Belgian dealers,
the GERO-fabriek arrangement denied Belgian consumers
potentially lower prices and their fair share of any
improvement in distribution. The Commission also considered
"' On the other hand, because the Miller agreement had not been notified
to the Commission for an individual exemption, there was no discussion in
the decision as to the applicability of 85(3). Relevant precedents, however,
indicate that direct export bans are seldom exemptible. See Newitt, 1992
O.J. (L 131) at 44 (finding Article 85(3) ground inapplicable), Who, 1992
O.J. (L 233) at 31 (same); see also Modt et Chandon, 1982 O.J. (L 94) at 9-
10, 2 C.M.L.R. at 171 (rejecting argument that export prohibitions could be
justified by the tightness of supplies in each of the involved national
markets).
"' See Commission Decision 77/66, Re GERO-fabriek, 1977 O.J. (L 16) 8.
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that it was far from certain that these restrictions were
needed to improve distribution. For those reasons, it refused
to grant an exemption to the contested agreement under
Article 85(3).
3.3.4. The Use of Industrial Property Rights to Achieve
Absolute Territorial Protection and the Grundig-Consten
Case
The use of trademark rights by their owners to prevent
parallel imports from one Member State to another has been
the subject of considerable debate. National trademark laws
were initially enacted to indicate the origin of a
manufacturer's goods and to differentiate them from
comparable products of other manufacturers. From the
inception of the European Union, many commentators
predicted that national industrial property legislation would
be useful as a means of perpetuating national market
compartmentalization, since any attempt to engage in
interstate trade or parallel imports could become tainted by an
infringement of the respective rights.49 To discourage such
use of national trademark legislation, Article 36 of the Treaty
of Rome creates an exception to the general validity of national
property systems of different Member States found in Article
222. Article 36 introduces a limitation on the unfettered
exercise of national industrial property rights, stating that it
must not "constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade between Member States."
50
The Grundig-Consten case51 involved two trademarks
49 See, e.g., COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 246 (James A.
Rahl ed., 1970); Rex Brown, The Effect of the European Common Market on
Trademarks, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 515, 522 (1959); Remo Franceschelli,
Trademark Problems in the Common Market, 50 TRADEMARK REP. 306, 308
(1960); Michel Waelbroeck, Trademark Problems in the European Common
Market, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 333, 362-63 (1964).
"0 Treaty on European Union, Together with the Complete Text of the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art.
36, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 16, 17 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
" Commission Decision 64/566, Grundig-Consten, 1964 J.O. 2545, on
appeal Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Commission, 1966
E.C.R. 299, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8,046 (1966). Much has been
written about this decision. See Leon J. DeKeyser, Territorial Restrictions
and Export Prohibitions Under the United States and the Common Market
Antitrust Laws, 2 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 271, 288 (1964-65); Arved
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registered in two European countries, owned not by a single
person but by two separate traders: a manufacturer and its
national exclusive distributor. Therefore, the principle of
"exhaustion," which mandates that trademark protection
ceases to exist, or is "exhausted," once a manufacturer affixes
the trademark on its goods and releases them into the market,
did not apply.
The facts of the case are well-known: Grundig, a German
manufacturer of electrical appliances, appointed Consten as its
exclusive distributor in France. To protect Consten from
parallel imports from other Member States, Grundig
prohibited its exclusive distributors in other countries from
selling in France. To make sure that this prohibition would be
respected, and although all products already bore a GRUNDIG
trademark, Consten registered an additional trademark, GINT,
in France under its own name. Consten planned to transfer
the trademark to Grundig or to cancel its registration at the
end of its relationship with Grundig. Both the Commission
and the Court held that the combination of export bans and
the use of the GINT trademark obstructed parallel imports
and violated Article 85(1). In addition, Article 222 was
deemed inapplicable because the GRUNDIG trademark was
held sufficient to indicate to consumers the source of every
electrical appliance.
Both the Commission and the Court also rejected the
applicability of Article 85(3) and refused to grant an exemption
to the exclusive agreement because it eliminated intrabrand
competition and prevented French consumers from obtaining
Deringer, Exclusive Agency Agreements With Territorial Protection Under
the E.E.C. Antitrust Laws-With an Opinion on the Grundig-Consten Case,
10 ANTITRUST BULL. 599 (1965); Lawrence F. Ebb, The Grundig-Consten
Case Revisited: Judicial Harmonization of National Law and Treaty Law
in the Common Market, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 855 (1967); Carl H. Fulda, The
Exclusive Distributor and the Antitrust Laws of the Common Market of
Europe and the United States, 3 TEx. INT'L L.F. 209, 211 (1967); Carl H.
Fulda, The First Antitrust Decisions of the Commission of the European
Community, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 625, 631 (1965); Klaus Newes, The European
Commission's First Major Antitrust Decision (Grundig-Consten), 20 BUS.
LAW. 431 (1964-65); Pierre Regimbeau, et al., Regulation ofDistribution and
Sales Agreements in the Common Market, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 195, 198
(1965); Gerard J. Weiser, Recent E.E.C. Antitrust Activity Relating to
Exclusive Distributorships and Trademarks, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 863, 875
(1965).
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a fair share of benefits in the form of lower prices. In
addition, parallel importers could not buy goods from Germany
at discount and resell them in France. Finally, the
"indispensability" test was not met. Arguments in favor of
providing absolute territorial protection to Consten, which
would have allowed it to engage in and rely upon advance
planning and to provide adequate warranties or after-sales
services, were all rejected.5"
3.3.5. Controlling Price Mechanisms to Impede Parallel
Imports in the Hennessy-Henkell Decision
The difference in price levels at which a manufacturer's
goods are sold throughout the European Union is the essential
factor creating incentives for parallel imports from one
Member State to another. Parallel importers normally buy
from low-priced countries and sell in the high-priced ones,
undercutting local exclusive distributors. The control of resale
prices by a manufacturer is thus an effective means of
monitoring its distributors' operations within the
manufacturer's network. Although, in principle, any tampering
with the price mechanism is unanimously condemned in
Europe (as in the United States), control of resale prices
acquires a different dimension when used to enforce territorial
restraints or to shield exclusive distributors from undesirable
invasions by others in their territories. The Commission and
the Court of Justice have confronted several situations in
which the manipulation of resale prices of goods was used for
this purpose.
In Hennessy-Henkell,5" for example, a producer of
alcoholic beverages (Hennessy) agreed to a sale price low
enough to permit its exclusive distributor (Henkell) to charge
a correspondingly low resale price in order to ensure protection
from "the point of view of prices against infiltration" under
Article 5(4) of the agreement. 4 They further stipulated in
Article 6 of the agreement that the distributor would fix its
82 See Grundig-Consten, 1964 J.O. at 2549; Consten, S.A.R.L., 1966
E.C.R. at 347.
" See Commission Decision 80/1333, Hennessy-Henkell, 1980 O.J. (L
383) 11.
54 See id at 12.
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resale price at a specified low level so that parallel importers
would find it unprofitable to compete. 5 The Commission
used strict language to make clear that Article 85(1) was
applicable because Hennessy's intervention in the
determination of prices both deprived Henkell of the freedom
to fix its own prices and held margins at such a low level that
traders from other Member States were kept out of the
German market.56
Article 85(3), by contrast, was found inapplicable." The
curtailment of the exclusive distributor's freedom to set resale
prices at a lower level than the one agreed upon deprived
German consumers of a fair share of any improvements in
distribution. Additionally, the resale restrictions failed the
"indispensability" test because the Commission found that
distribution could be improved without them.
3.3.6. Dual Pricing to Combat Parallel Imports and the
Distillers Case
A variation of the price mechanism control is dual pricing.
This occurs when a manufacturer charges different prices
based on whether its customer plans to resell within its own
Member State or to export to other states. Dual pricing
frustrates parallel trading, distorts competition among traders
of various Member States, and creates a counter-incentive for
exports. Both the antitrust enforcement authorities and the
judiciary in the European Union view dual pricing as plainly
anticompetitive and antithetical to the ideal of European
integration.
In Distillers,8 a group of distillery companies that
produced a wide variety of alcoholic beverages in the United
Kingdom applied different conditions of sale and price terms
to trade customers that resold locally and to those that resold
"s See id.
56 See id. at 14-15.
67 See id. at 15-17.
5" See Commission Decision 78/163, Distillers Co. Ltd., 1978 O.J. (L 50)
16. See also Chard, supra note 1, at 429; C.W.F. Baden Fuller, Price
Variations-The Distillers Case and Article 85 EEC, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
128, 129 (1979); Valentine Korah, "Goodbye," Red Label: Condemnation of
Dual Pricing By Distillers, 1978 EUR. L. REV. 62, 65, 68; Thomas Sharpe,
The Distillers Decision, 15 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 447, 458 (1978).
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on the Continent, where Distillers had recently appointed
national exclusive distributors to promote its products. While
the former group received substantial discounts on the
purchase price (i.e., certain allowances, rebates and discounts),
the latter group was charged the gross price without any
discount. Without taking into account the market position of
Distillers in the countries of Continental Europe, the
Commission held that Distillers' dual pricing policy
discouraged parallel imports and prevented the lower prices of
Scotch whisky from existing in Continental Europe. Dual
pricing thus amounted to an indirect export ban and resulted
in the absolute territorial protection of European exclusive
distributors in violation of Article 85(1).
The Commission also refused to grant an individual
exemption under 85(3) with respect to Distillers' conditions of
sale. It argued that no improvement in distribution had come
about and that European consumers were deprived of the
benefit of lower prices. All the justifications proffered by
Distillers concerning the higher promotion and advertising
costs of the sole distributors in Europe who needed to be
protected from price competition by resellers exporting from
the United Kingdom were similarly rejected. 9
3.3.7. Selective Distribution Systems Obstructing Parallel
Imports and the Hasselblad Decision
Selective distribution systems are defined as systems
established by manufacturers of certain technically complex or
high quality goods who appoint specialized wholesalers or
retailers with the necessary knowledge or technical expertise
required to preserve the quality of those products or to provide
specialist services to resellers and consumers."0
Manufacturers often use these systems to exclude from their
networks those retailers that would buy their goods from
parallel importers or engage in parallel importing themselves.
In Hasselblad,1 a manufacturer of specialized professional
See Distillers, 1978 O.J. (L 50) at 26, 28, 29.
60 For an extended analysis on selective distribution systems in the
European Union, see Gijilstra & Murphy, supra note 14, at 81, and HAWK,
supra note 30, at 483.
1 See Hasselblad, 1982 O.J. (L 161) at 18; Case 86/82 Hasselblad (GB)
Ltd. v. Commission, 1984 E.C.R. 883, 1 C.M.L.R. 559 (1984).
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cameras appointed sole distributors in the various Member
States of the European Union. In the United Kingdom, where
the exclusive distribution had been entrusted to Hasselblad
(GB), retailers were appointed according to a selective system
which, on its face, was based on such criteria as their technical
qualifications and the suitability of their premises. The
criteria were meant to ensure that the retailers could
successfully promote and service such highly complex goods as
professional cameras. The Commission found, however, that
Hasselblad was using largely arbitrary criteria to select its
retailers (e.g., whether the retailer would be willing to buy its
goods from parallel importers at lower prices). As a result,
many retailers were excluded from the system even though
they met the stated qualitative criteria. Camera Care, once
Hasselblad's dealer in the United Kingdom, was terminated
after selling goods there which were purchased abroad at
discount prices. Since price advertisements were overseen in
the United Kingdom, Camera Care suggested that it was
terminated because it did not respect an alleged system of
fixed retail prices.6"
Both the Commission and the Court of Justice found that
this selective system had as its purpose the exclusion of all
dealers. By not allowing Camera Care to compete in price
with other appointed dealers within the system, the system
restricted competition and interstate trade and violated Article
85(1). No exemption was granted under 85(3) because the
prevention of parallel imports and of price competition at the
retail level would deprive English consumers of a fair share of
the benefits of Hasselblad's distribution system and would
isolate the United Kingdom from the markets of other Member
States.
3.3.8. The Limitation of Guarantee Rights and the ETA
Decision
Absolute territorial protection of exclusive distributors may
also be achieved by limiting the guarantee rights of consumers
to only those goods that have been purchased by the local
exclusive distributor. In ETA,6  a manufacturer of
62 See Hasselblad, 1984 E.C.R. at 888, 889.
See Case 31/85, ETA Fabriques d'Ebauches S.A. v. DK Investment
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inexpensive watches distributed its products in the E.U.
through a network of national exclusive distributors. It also
restricted recognition of warranties covering physical defects
in watches to those consumers who had bought them from the
official network of the national exclusive distributors. By
contrast, the manufacturer refused to honor warranties for
watches purchased from parallel importers. In its decision,
the Court again omitted any analysis of the relevant market
structure in which cross-trade had been restricted. The Court
rejected ETA's argument that parallel importers could not be
made to comply with its specifications concerning the
maximum storage period for the watches and might therefore
sell watches in a deteriorated condition. The Court reasoned
that since ETA watches were not technically complex goods
requiring extra care, the limitation on warranties was abusive.
It concluded that the existence of guarantee rights is an
essential factor in the decision-making process of consumers
when buying a product, and that consequently ETA blocked
parallel imports and violated 85(1).
4. THE ECONOMIC APPROACH AS INCORPORATED IN THE U.S.
LAW OF EXCLUSIVE AND RESTRICTED TERRITORIAL
DISTRIBUTION: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
4.1. The Procompetitive Character of Exclusive Distribution
and Vertical Territorial Restraints
Economic theory and experience teach that not only
exclusive distribution agreements but also vertical restraints
that protect exclusive distributors from territorial incursions
by their competitors may have procompetitive effects. They
may therefore be an expression of a rationalized distribution
policy, with the aim of enhancing economic efficiency.
The procompetitive character of those practices is
inextricably linked to unity of interests of manufacturers and
consumers. In general, as several antitrust scholars following
the Chicago School of thought suggest, it is in a
manufacturer's interest to maintain its distributors' markups
as low as possible. The lower the distributors' profits, the
S.A., 1985 E.C.R. 3933, 2 C.M.L.R. 674 (1986).
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lower the manufacturer's distribution costs, which results in
lower retail prices charged to the ultimate consumers. Higher
prices, caused by larger profits of distributors insulated from
competition, may result in lost sales and diminished profits for
the manufacturer. Since, as a matter of principle,
manufacturers in a competitive market are price takers, only
those that keep their distribution costs low will avoid losing
customers to competitors. 4 Therefore, if manufacturers
grant exclusivity to their distributors, they might do so to
attract capable and aggressive traders in their distribution
networks who are willing to: (1) make the investments
necessary for the successful dissemination of the manufactured
goods; (2) provide pre-sale or post-sale services, especially if
expensive goods are involved; or (3) commit themselves to
promoting new products aggressively. Additionally,
manufacturers might appoint a small number of exclusive
distributors in order to decrease their own sales costs,
minimize credit risks, facilitate production planning, or permit
94 See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
370-72 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule
of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 147 (1984); Peter M. Gerhart, The
"Competitive Advantages" Explanation for Intrabrand Restraints: An
Antitrust Analysis, 1981 DUKE L.J. 417, 435; Victor P. Goldberg, The Free
Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services,
79 Nw. U. L. REV. 736, 744-46 (1984); Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical
Restrictions and Monopoly Power, 64 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1984); Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr., The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated
Restrictions on Distribution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2, 29 (1988);
Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977); F.M.
Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 692
(1983); Louis M. Solomon & Robert D. Joffe, Exclusive Distribution and
Antitrust, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 491, 496-506 (1984); Lester G. Telser, Why
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 90 (1960);
Lawrence J. White, Vertical Restraints in Antitrust Law: A Coherent Model,
26 ANTITRUST BULL. 327, 331 (1981); Arthur H. Travers, Jr. & Thomas D.
Wright, Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act,
75 HARV. L. REV. 795, 811, 813 (1962). But see LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 411-21 (1977); William S. Comanor,
Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust
Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985); John J. Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of
Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Services Corp., 71
CORNELL L. REV. 1095, 1134-42 (1986); Robert L. Steiner, Intrabrand
Competition-Stepchild of Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 155, 159, 183, 187
(1991) [hereinafter Intrabrand Competition]; Robert L. Steiner, Sylvania
Economics-A Critique, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 49, 59 (1991) [hereinafter
Sylvania Economics].
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the development of scale economies at the downstream level.
Alternatively, a manufacturer might further establish
vertical territorial restrictions, thereby impeding cross-sales
among the contract territories of its exclusive distributors in
order to avoid inter-organizational problems in its network.
Sometimes, however, mere exclusivity is inadequate to protect
the distributors' investments against those competitors who
reap the fruits of their own efforts and expenses. This is
especially true in situations in which transportation costs
within the contract territory and general cross-selling barriers
are low. If the exclusive distributor is required to provide
services for expensive goods or to market new products
aggressively while out-of-territory distributors or resellers are
left to sell freely the same products at a discount, then the
resulting free rider problem may force the exclusive distributor
to stop providing services, engage in promotional activities, or
go out of business. Consumers desiring these services or
promotional activities, which inform them about the marketed
goods, may become dissatisfied. The superior goodwill of the
manufacturer's products may be harmed. 5 Although some
consumers may welcome free riders offering lower-priced
goods, free riding harms the "invaded" distributor, by making
its efforts to provide upgraded distribution facilities or to make
purchasers familiar with its suppliers' products
unsuccessful.6 On the other hand, vertical integration is too
6 The notion of "free riding" was first developed by Telser in his article
on fair trade and resale price maintenance, supra note 64, at 91. See also
William F. Baxter, Vertical Practices-Half Slave, Half Free, 52 ANTITRUST
L.J. 743, 746-47 (1983); Ernest Gellhorn & Teresa Tatham, Making Sense
Out of the Rule of Reason, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 155, 176-77 (1984);
George A. Hay, The Free Rider Rationale and Vertical Restraints Analysis
Reconsidered, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 27, 29 (1987); Posner, supra note 64, at 6;
White, supra note 64, at 332. But see St. John Barrett, Restrictive
Distribution and the Assault of the "Free-Riders", 7 J. CORP. L. 467, 473-74
(1982) (noting that not all point-of-sale services are subject to free riding).
", Such activities are often referred to by some commentators as
"opportunistic." "Opportunism" is any post-contractual manipulative
activity that results in an unexpected transfer of wealth to any of the
contracting parties, against which, however, the injured parties may not
take any retaliatory measures. In our case, "free riders" enrich themselves
at the expense of the incumbent exclusive distributors, who may not
retaliate against them. See Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical
Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational
Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organization Theory,
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extreme a measure by which to control such inter-
organizational distribution problems. Vertical integration is
very costly and, hence, unattainable for those small
manufacturers unable to raise the necessary funds or lacking
the expertise to set up their own distribution systems. In
addition, vertical integration transforms distributors into mere
employees of the manufacturers, depriving them of freedom
and discretion. Therefore, vertical territorial restraints are
the most suitable means to remedy those problems,6 7 while
still maintaining the advantages of market distribution of
products (e.g., hiring independent distributors).
Manufacturers appointing independent traders to distribute
their products may benefit from economies of scale and scope
as well as from the core competencies developed by the
latter."8
Furthermore, the institution of vertical territorial
restrictions may preserve the quality of manufacturers' goods,
thus maximizing consumer satisfaction. For example,
exclusive distributors not burdened by free riders may
willingly spend the money needed for product quality and
safety. Alternatively, in the absence of cross-selling among
distributors' territories, the source of defective products may
32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1015-16 (1983).
617 On the contrary, other "less restrictive" methods of protecting
distributors against free riders might not be as effective. For example, even
if manufacturers directly pay distributors' expenses to avoid free riding in
their networks, manufacturers might still need to institute a system of
control to detect whether such payments are used for improvements in their
distribution network, or to fill the pockets of the distributors themselves.
Detecting cross-selling and violations of vertical territorial restrictions is
much easier than meticulously monitoring distributor performance.
Alternatively, if a manufacturer, in order to deter opportunistic activities,
provides services or other marketing activities distinct from its product and
consumers are correspondingly charged for the services they desire, then
distributors must also bear the costs of instituting a marginal cost pricing
system adjusted to individual consumer needs. See Telser, supra note 64,
at 92-94. Additionally, some services (e.g., advertising) may not be sold to
consumers separately from the products.
"' Vertical integration patterns would favor, on the other hand, the
effective flow of information among manufacturing and distributing
divisions of a single firm, better coordination and control by central
management, etc. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS,
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 544-62 (1991). See also Oliver E.
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications
of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 969-72 (1979).
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be more easily traced, thereby motivating each exclusive
distributor to maintain the quality standards of its supplier.
4.2. Inherent Anticompetitive Effects of Exclusive Distribution
and Vertical Territorial Restraints: Market Structure as a
Response
Although exclusive distributorships and vertical territorial
restrictions are means used by manufacturers to organize
rationalized distribution networks, such devices negatively
affect intrabrand competition-at best curtailing it and at
worst eliminating it.8" Exclusive distributorships and
vertical territorial restrictions also tend to stabilize distributor
prices within each exclusive territory, thus jeopardizing the
welfare of certain consumers. As intrabrand competition is
restricted, customers of exclusive distributors are compelled to
accept high resale prices even though such prices might reflect
a number of non-price efficiencies offered by distributors in
connection with the product (e.g., services, advertising and
promotion).
One may distinguish three categories of consumers based
on effects of exclusive distribution and vertical territorial
schemes. The first consumer category values most non-price
efficiencies and responds favorably when the manufacturer or
distributors offer them. A second consumer category simply
does not need the efficiencies, and instead, buys a smaller
quantity of the product. Finally, a third category, the so-called
"inframarginal consumers," are insensitive to any increase in
the price of the product. No matter how high the price is,
these "inframarginal consumers" buy the same quantity of the
particular product. It follows that as a result of non-price
efficiencies, only the first category of consumers is better off.
In contrast, the welfare of the second and third categories of
"9 Intrabrand competition is perceived by many antitrust theorists as a
significant source of rivalry in the market because it induces distributors to
lower prices, enhance efficiency, and improve performance by discovering
innovations, introducing new methods of distribution, and generally keeping
consumer satisfaction at a maximum level. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A
Reformed Antitrust Approach to Distributor Terminations, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 271, 297-99 (1992); Intrabrand Competition, supra note 64, at 159,
183, 187; Sylvania Economics, supra note 64, at 44, 54.
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consumers is impaired. °
The effects of non-price efficiencies may not, however, be
viewed only in the abstract, independently of the structure of
the relevant market in which the exclusive and vertical
territorial schemes are instituted or of the market position of
the instituting manufacturer. For example, the structure of
the relevant market and other market characteristics indicate
the degree to which other forms of competition are available to
fill the vacuum created by the elimination of intrabrand
competition at the distributor level. Additionally, the market
structure indicates the extent to which inframarginal and
other consumers, allegedly harmed by the exclusive and
vertical schemes, maintain the freedom to select desired
brands. Finally, weak manufacturers facing strong interbrand
competition may be unwilling to adopt exclusive and vertical
territorial practices for anticompetitive purposes because high
distribution margins may push consumers to buy competitive
brands or comparable goods.
Because intrabrand competition is eliminated as a result of
exclusive and territorial schemes, even distributors
representing a weak manufacturer who faces numerous
interbrand rivals will charge higher prices than if intrabrand
competition existed without restraint. Such prices or other
terms of sale must, however, be adjusted to meet equivalent
conditions under which the distributors of interbrand rivals
offer comparable products. With vigorous interbrand
competition among manufacturers (and their distributors) in
the relevant market, distribution mark-ups will not rise to
excessive levels, as would happen if interbrand competition
were weak (due to the manufacturer's large market share or
the differentiation of its product) or if manufacturer
concentration rates were high."1 Interbrand competitive
forces balance and alleviate the inherent anticompetitive
effects of intrabrand restrictions, no matter how intense these
" See Comanor, supra note 64, at 983 (suggesting that vertical non-price
restraints should be illegal because of the harm they inflict on inframarginal
consumers). But see Don Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr.,
Inframarginal Consumers and the Per Se Legality of Vertical Restraints, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 148-56 (1988).
71 See Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 16 (1981).
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anticompetitive effects may be. On the contrary, weak
interbrand competition or a high concentration level among
competing manufacturers requires the preservation of
intrabrand competition as the primary source of rivalry in the
relevant market.72
Interbrand competition may provide a better alternative for
the two categories of consumers who endure a partial loss of
surplus due to the existence of exclusive and vertical
territorial schemes, thereby enabling these consumers to
choose manufacturers offering more favorable "product-service"
mixes. Such consumers also have viable alternatives in
markets not excessively covered by exclusive and vertical
territorial restraints because other forms of distribution (e.g.,
providing low-priced products without non-price efficiencies)
remain available.
4.3. The Distributors' Cartel and the "Cartel Ringmaster"
Hypothesis: An Exception to the Rule
Exclusive distributorships and vertical territorial
restrictions sometimes serve as catalysts or implementing
vehicles by which to establish an unlawful distributor
cartel."3 As a result, the monopolist-distributor or the
72 Concentration at the manufacturer level might be especially dangerous
in causing oligopolistic interdependence. Should all manufacturers of an
industry decide to follow the example of one competitor and incorporate
similar vertical schemes in their networks, the relevant market could be
flooded by such restrictive schemes, excluding other forms of distribution.
See Scherer, supra note 64, at 704.
"' "Catalyst" refers to situations in which these practices facilitate the
organization of a cartel, while "implementing vehicle" refers to the practices
used to enforce the cartel and punish cheaters (e.g., by excluding
discounters from the colluding group). Opponents of the collusive character
of exclusive and vertical territorial restrictions argue that cartels "hidden"
under such practices may be dealt with and condemned under the
conventional rules applying to horizontal agreements and that there is
therefore no real case against them on such grounds. See, e.g., Posner,
supra note 71, at 22. See also Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels"
Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 20-23 (1982). In the vast majority
of cases, the anticompetitive use of exclusive and territorial schemes will be
invoked either when one or more distributors pressure a common supplier
to grant them exclusivity or airtight territorial protection, or when a
distributor complains to the manufacturer that a competitor is a discounter
and requests immediate termination. The problem of how to distinguish
acceptable and procompetitive exclusive and territorial practices, which
enhance the competitiveness of a manufacturer's distribution network, from
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distributors-cartelists restrict output to consumers, raising the
prices of the particular product. The distributors' supplier
may act as a "cartel ringmaster," that is, as an instrumentality
yielding to the distributors' pressures and responsible for
coordinating the cartel and terminating its cheaters.74 Why,
however, would the supplier agree to go along with such a
plan? One explanation is that the supplier needs some or all
of the pressuring distributors because they are either
powerful 5 or are the only ones that may keep the
distribution of its product functioning at a minimum efficient
scale. Additionally, there might be a general lack of available
distributors in the market because, for example, other
distributors are tied up by competing suppliers bound by
exclusive purchasing obligations and are therefore unable to
carry the supplier's products. A second explanation might be
that the manufacturer has agreed to favor the anticompetitive
plans formulated by its distributors because the manufacturer
will share some of their profits in exchange for its coordinating
and supervisory role. Of those two arguments, the first seems
more compelling. The second, although not unrealistic,
sometimes runs afoul of the basic premise that a manufacturer
wants to minimize its distribution costs to reduce distribution
mark-ups. Sharing some of the distributors' profits might not
practices which merely further the anticompetitive desires of distributors
has been the subject of voluminous literature. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino,
Jr., Distributor Terminations Pursuant to Conspiracies Among a Supplier
and ComplainingDistributors: A Suggested Antitrust Analysis, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 297 (1982) [hereinafter Piraino I]; Piraino, supra note 69; Thomas
A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp Dealing: The Horizontal/ Vertical Dichotomy in
Distribution Termination Cases, 38 EMORY L.J. 311 (1989) [hereinafter
Piraino II]; Ned E. Barlas, Comment, Dealers Coercing Manufacturers: A
Proposal for a UnilateralAntitrust Offense, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2335 (1989);
Comment, Vertical Agreement As Horizontal Restraint: Cernuto, Inc. v.
United Cabinet Corp., 128 U. PA. L. REV. 622 (1980) [hereinafter Comment
I]; Comment, Vertical Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors:
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92 HARv. L. REV. 1160 (1979) [hereinafter
Comment II].
7" The term "ringmaster" is used in Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven
C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power
Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 238 (1986).
" A distributor will usually be considered "powerful" when it carries a
significantly large volume of the manufacturer's goods, so that its absence
might leave a significant percentage of purchasers unsatisfied or create
substantial transaction costs for replacement of the distributor. See Piraino,
supra note 69, at 303.
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adequately compensate a manufacturer who has lost sales due
to high distributor prices. In some cases, however, sharing of
distributor profits might be adequate, and the "ringmaster"
might be sufficiently compensated for its contribution to the
organization and implementation of the distributors' cartel.
Such "horizontal" practices, which further the
anticompetitive purposes of distributors, must be distinguished
from those "vertical" schemes utilized by manufacturers whose
only motivation is to improve their competitive status. When
they grant exclusivity to their distributors or protect
distributor territories, manufacturers induce distributors to
invest in the successful promotion of their products without
the negative impact of opportunistic activities, while
preventing distributors from enjoying supracompetitive profits.
The distinction is not easy, but it is facilitated by the
following considerations:
1) The purpose of an exclusive or territorial practice. The
purpose of enhancing manufacturer competitiveness may
indicate a vertical character, while the purpose of
enhancing the distributors' desire to share
supracompetitive profits among themselves or with the
manufacturer may indicate a horizontal character.7
2) The form of the scheme. The fact that, on its face, a
practice might seem horizontal or vertical may not
necessarily determine its procompetitive or anticompetitive
function. For example, an exclusive and territorial practice
within a dual distribution network that is horizontal in
form may in fact be an expression of the independent
business purposes of the manufacturer."7
3) The involvement of one or more distributors in the
institution or enforcement of the exclusive or territorial
schemes. Such involvement should be irrelevant because
distributors usually communicate useful market
information to their suppliers, who are thus assisted in the
more effective organization of their distribution network.
The fact that one or more distributors convey to their
supplier(s) information about competitive pricing behavior
76 See Comment I, supra note 73, at 631.
" See Tyler A. Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and
Economics in the Section I Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1457, 1509-10 (1981); Piraino I, supra note 73, at 307.
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does not indicate that a distributor necessarily harbors
anticompetitive purposes. It may simply be explained by
their common concern of circumventing free rider
problems."'
4.4. U.S. Case Law on Exclusive Distribution and Vertical
Territorial Restraints: The Establishment of a Market
Structure Filter in the Rule-of-Reason Approach
For almost two decades, economic theories favoring the
"efficiency" and "market structure" approaches have been an
integral part of U.S. law regarding exclusive distribution and
vertical territorial arrangements. The endorsement of such
theories in U.S. antitrust considerations is primarily due to
the absence of regulatory interventions and the consequent
flexibility in the analysis of restricted distribution issues. E.U.
competition law gives both the antitrust enforcer and judge
statutory guidelines (located primarily in Regulation 83/83) to
determine (1) which provisions in an exclusive- distribution
arrangement are lawful and which are not; and (2) which
factors prevail in a rule-of-reason analysis under Article 85(3).
By contrast, U.S. law on those issues has been overwhelmingly
judge-made. The U.S. judiciary is given almost complete
discretion to apply Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits any contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade."9 Additionally, U.S. courts scrutinize cases of
exclusive and restricted distribution at will to determine if
such schemes dangerously impede competition, and to specify
whether and how their evaluation is connected to the structure
of the relevant markets in which such schemes exist.
4.4.1. GTE Sylvania and the Market Structure Approach
Issued in reaction to the Schwinn decision which held
vertical post-sale non-price restrictions per se illegal on the
8 See Baker, supra note 77, at 1505-06. Rather, the content and the
type of the possible communications may be a strong indication of the
purpose hidden under the adoption of exclusive distributorships and
territorial restraints. For example, ultimatum-type communications from
one or more distributors to their supplier should more or less be considered
dangerous. See Piraino I, supra note 73, at 334.
79 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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rather arbitrary ground that manufacturers parting with title,
dominion and control over their products could not control
their subsequent distribution,0  the Supreme Court's
Sylvania decision introduced the Rule of Reason standard to
this area of antitrust."' The application of the Rule of
Reason to all vertical non-price restrictions without distinction
based on degree or form is important because all such
arrangements currently are evaluated under the same
standard, regardless of the arrangement's effects on
intrabrand competition. Instead, their general effect on
competition weighs most heavily in judging their
reasonableness.
Indeed, one significant aspect of Sylvania relates to the
purported need to examine the effect of the challenged
practices only "in light of the competitive situation 'in the
product market as a whole." Such an examination is not
complete, however, merely by concluding that a vertical
restriction has reduced or even eliminated intrabrand
competition. This reduction or elimination of intrabrand
competition should be subsequently balanced against any
interbrand effects created by the restraints in question.8
Interbrand competition, the Court said, creates an important
source of rivalry within a market by providing a check on the
lack of intrabrand competition that results from the institution
of the restraints, because consumers can "substitute a different
brand of the same product."" The Sylvania Court also
acknowledged that it is likely that vertical non-price
restrictions have a procompetitive function. Based on
economic evidence, the Court observed that "manufacturers
have an economic interest in maintaining as much intrabrand
80 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1967).
s Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977). See
generally Michael L. Denger, Vertical Restrictions: The Impact of Sylvania,
46 ANTITRUST L.J. 908 (1977-78) (arguing that Sylvania will be heralded as
a landmark decision with significant implications beyond its holding);
Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SUP. CT. REV.
171, 171-72 (discussing whether Sylvania is a promising antitrust decision
or merely the latest inconclusive statement by the Court in the area of
vertical restraint law).
82 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 45 (quoting Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 382).
8 Id. at 57 n.27.
I41d. at 52 n.19.
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competition as is consistent with the efficient distribution of
their products." 5 Therefore, no business would institute
territorial or customer restrictions merely to enrich its
distributors or to increase their mark-ups.
This does not mean that Sylvania excludes the possibility
that some of the restrictions at issue will be condemned as per
se violations. After Sylvania, however, the application of the
per se rule "must be based upon demonstrable economic effect
rather than-as in Schwinn-upon formalistic line
drawing."S6  For example, horizontal restrictions among
distributors deserve per se treatment.
Sylvania is now the law governing vertical arrangements.
Although it cured the inconsistencies and corrected the
weaknesses of Schwinn by requiring an analysis of the overall
competitive impact of vertical non-price arrangements and by
acknowledging their efficiency-enhancing nature, the Sylvania
decision provided only general directions concerning the
application of the Rule of Reason to vertical territorial
restrictions, leaving lower courts free to refine the application.
As a result, classifying vertical non-price restraints as "notper
se illegal" began a debate as to how a Rule of Reason could be
applied in this context and which factors would be considered
prominently in the analysis. Supplying a general statement as
to the applicability of a general method of analysis is one
thing. Inventing a specialized formula that creates
appropriate rebuttable presumptions based on specific
amounts of evidence," allocates the burden of proof among
plaintiffs and defendants, and balances the pro- and
anticompetitive aspects of the contested vertical schemes in
each individual case, while allowing businesses to organize
their networks efficiently without unduly jeopardizing
competition in the relevant market, is quite a different
proposition.
Since Sylvania, lower courts have sought to refine the Rule
85 Id, at 56.
86 Id- at 59. See also id. at 58 n.28 (recognizing occasional problems in
distinguishing between vertical and horizontal restrictions).
87 But see, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 9, 1 1649c, at 550-51 (referring to
examples where the presumption of illegality in the vertical non-price
restraint context should not be rebuttable, but rather conclusive, as it is
unlikely that parties would be able to produce evidence supporting opposite
contentions).
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of Reason enunciated by the Supreme Court. All courts, using
a ubiquitous market power filter, have characterized vertical
territorial and other non-price restrictions as presumptively
legal, leaving plaintiffs to challenge their validity.8 The
majority of decisions imply that with a proper market analysis
and a plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that the defendant
manufacturer possesses market power, a defendant can prove
that a territorial scheme does not have anticompetitive effects.
Courts refer to business justifications not as a part of the Rule
of Reason analysis, but rather to clarify the benefits of the
challenged practice.8" Small manufacturers supposedly use
88 Some courts, however, have required a showing of a pro-competitive
justification for the restrictions in addition to the failure of the plaintiff to
demonstrate a large market share controlled by the instituting
manufacturer before immunizing challenged vertical non-price restrictions.
See Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1573 (11th Cir.
1983) (stating that the rule of reason involves a two-step analysis: (1)
examining the effects of the restraints on competition, mainly on the basis
of the manufacturer's market power; and (2) offering an adequate rationale
for the restraints, which might include interpreting the intent of the
manufacturer); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190,
1202 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that the basic inquiry to determine the
reasonableness ofthe attacked vertical non-price restrictions is: (1) whether
the defendant manufacturer has market power, thus inflicting a substantial
harm on competition; and (2) whether there are any justifications for the
adoption of the restrictions), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984). Other courts
have upheld such contested schemes only when no less restrictive means
were available to achieve the same business purposes. See, e.g., Cowley v.
Braden Indus., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir.) ("[T]here was no showing.., of
any effective, alternate means to maintain an efficient distributor system."),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
"8 See Murrow Furniture Galleries v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., 889
F.2d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[A] finding of no market power precludes any
need to further balance the competitive effects of the challenged restraint."
(quoting Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir.
1986))); Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th
Cir. 1988) (affirming grant of summary judgment because plaintiffs failed
to raise a material issue of fact regarding anticompetitive effect);
Pennsylvania v. Pepsico, 836 F.2d 173 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that effective
interbrand competition justifies the immunization of territorial restraints);
Three Movies of Tarzana v. Pacific Theaters, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th
Cir. 1987) (noting vertical restraints are reasonable if likely to increase
interbrand competition without unduly restricting intrabrand competition);
Ryko Mfg. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1231-32 (8th Cir. 1987)
(manufacturer's market power will only be required in order to effectively
challenge a vertical non-price restraint, which will otherwise be upheld),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988); Assam, 798 F.2d at 319 ("The market
power approach is a proper method of evaluating vertical non-price
restraints under the rule of reason ... ."); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer,
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such schemes for efficiency-enhancing purposes. Most courts
define market power as the market share of a manufacturer
or, stated otherwise, the volume of a manufacturer's sales
compared to the sales of its competitors. Consequently, courts
limit the entire territorial restriction analysis to those
manufacturers possessing market power. To this end, courts
first must define the relevant product and geographic market
in which the particular manufacturer competes. The relevant
product market delineates the number of brands and goods
reasonably interchangeable with the manufacturer's brand.
The geographic market delineates the outer territorial
boundaries of the area within which these competitors seek the
patronage of the same consumers.9 0 Many decisions imply
792 F.2d 1464, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986) (failing to show an adverse effect on
interbrand competition will lead a court to dispose of antitrust claim against
resale non-price restriction); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg.,
Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that manufacturer's market
power must be primarily shown under the rule of reason standard, for
without it there may be no adverse effect on competition), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1018 (1984); Dart Indus. v. Plunkett Co., 704 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1983)
(denying relief in a situation in which plaintiff-appellee was unable to show
injury from an allegedly rigid and per se illegal vertical restraint); Golden
Gate Acceptance Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 597 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir.
1979) (acknowledging no antitrust violation results when defendant
manufacturer conspires with others to simply switch distributors at one
exclusive franchise and to cease doing business with former dealer); JBL
Enters. v. Jhirmack Enters., 698 F.2d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570,
575 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that, under rule of reason analysis, it must be
proved that the vertical non-price restrictions have a general
anticompetitive effect); see also Copy-Data Sys. v. Toshiba America, 663
F.2d 405, 411 (2d Cir. 1981) (reversing trial court's award of treble damages
to plaintiff-appellee because restriction imposed by defendant had sufficient
potential for enhancing interbrand competition under a rule of reason
analysis); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.
1981) (noting that although market power and effect on interbrand
competition are the main components of the Rule of Reason, there are also
secondary references to the business purposes served by the restraints); Red
Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1006 (5th
Cir. 1981) (observing that restrictions alleged to harm interbrand
competition actually may have improved interbrand competition), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
SO For an enlightening scholarly analysis, based on substantial court
precedents, of the factors to be taken into account when defining the
relevant product and geographic market, see William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 944-51,
960-67 (1981). According to the authors, the product market is not
composed solely of brands competing with each other, but it also includes
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that if the relevant market is not accurately defined, taking
into account several factors including entry of new producers
and potential expansion of output by existing manufacturers,
then using the manufacturer's market share as a factor of
analysis would be misleading for the outcome of the case.91
After determining which markets are relevant, courts
generally are unanimous in deciding the threshold level of
market share necessary for the condemnation of restraints.
Certainly, a de minimis share less than 5% of the relevant
market always leads to immunity.2 The manufacturer
involved in such cases is either a small or a failing firm that
depends on the institution of those restraints for its
establishment or survival. Territorial restraint practices of
manufacturers with shares amounting to 20% of the market or
less are also generally upheld."3 Beyond this level of market
"substitutes in consumption," "substitutes in production," the "output of
fringe firms" and the "entry of new competitors." Similarly, the geographic
market includes not only the competing manufacturers of a given geographic
area, but also other suppliers making substantial imports into this area
who, because of the absence of significant transportation costs, potentially
may divert all their production to this area. See also Kevin J. Arquit,
Market Power in Vertical Cases, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 921 (1991-92) (focusing
particularly on market power and its role in the analysis of non-price
vertical territorial restraints and customer restraints).
" See Murrow Furniture, 889 F.2d at 528-29 (concluding plaintiffs "have
not defined a relevant product market, let alone established that
[defendants] had market power"); Murphy, 854 F.2d at 1205 (observing that
the competitiveness of the relevant market, "the wholesale thermography
market for business cards, letterheads and envelopes," is unaffected by the
restraints in question); Ryko, 823 F.2d at 1231-32 (implying that the
existence of barriers to the entry of new firms or to increased output of
already operating firms may alter the definition of the relevant market);
Assam, 798 F.2d at 318 (making useful observations as to the area covered
by the geographic market); Graphic Prods., 717 F.2d at 1569-70 (explaining
that ample evidence demonstrated that the relevant geographic market was
national in scope while the relevant product market was merely one of
several products manufactured by defendant); JBL, 698 F.2d at 1016
(defining the market not only in terms of product and geographic factors but
also according to distribution level); Muenster Butane, 651 F.2d at 295-96
(stating the proper scope of the relevant product market was not Zenith
television sets, but rather all television sets).
92 See, e.g., JBL, 698 F.2d at 1017 (stating that a market share of
between 1% and 2% does not have a substantially adverse effect on
competition); Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 849, 852 (6th Cir. 1964)
(noting in a pre-Sylvania decision that where the manufacturer's share is
1%, closed distribution territories are upheld).
" See, e.g., Ryko, 823 F.2d at 1232 (relevant market power between 8%
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share, there is a certain ambiguity, although percentages of
50% or more prompt courts to question seriously the validity
of the challenged schemes.9 4 In evaluating the validity of a
territorial restriction, some courts also consider factual indicia
of competition, such as the number of competing suppliers and
the sensitivity or flexibility of the defendant manufacturer's
pricing, which reflects competitive pressures.9 5 From such
factual indicia, courts can determine whether a particular
manufacturer's position is sufficiently weak to warrant
upholding a territorial restriction.
Where a plaintiff succeeds in establishing manufacturer
market power, the defendant in turn has the burden of
supporting and justifying the contested vertical territorial
restraints. Thus, the burden of proof shifts to defendants only
under exceptional circumstances. 6
Further, after Sylvania courts have followed a similar
market analysis model and, despite the exclusionary effects of
exclusive distributorships for individual distributors," have
evaluated such practices on the basis of the market structure
where the exclusive distributorships were adopted.9"
and 10% does not convey ability to raise prices or restrict output); Assam,
798 F.2d at 318 (noting the existence of a market share of 19.1%).
"' See, e.g., Graphic Prods., 717 F.2d at 1569-70 (noting the existence of
a market share of 70-75%, enhanced by strong product differentiation will
satisfy the threshold burden). But see Cowley v. Braden Indus., 613 F.2d
751, 753, 756 (7th Cir. 1980) (choosing not to infer market power from a
share of over 70%).
'5 See, eg., Ryko, 823 F.2d at 1232.
g See Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines, 806 F.2d 722, 729
(7th Cir. 1986). Afew courts, however, have followed a justification-oriented
(rather than market structure-oriented) rule of reason, wherein vertical
territorial schemes lacking procompetitive justification are condemned
without regard to market factors. See, e.g., General Leaseways v. National
Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 592, 595 (7th Cir. 1984); Eiberger v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1079 (2d Cir. 1980).
9 See Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 807
(6th Cir. 1988); Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 735
(9th Cir. 1987); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Intl, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216,
1229 (10th Cir. 1986). See also Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d
126, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1978); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke
& Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062
(1970); Bay City-Abrahams Bros. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 1206,
1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
9" See Rutman Wine Co., 829 F.2d at 735; Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield
Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 666 (7th Cir. 1987); Westman Comm'n Co.,
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4.4.2. Exclusive Distributorships, Vertical Territorial
Restraints and Horizontal Action Claims
Instead of challenging exclusive distributorships and
vertical territorial restraints as unreasonable, some plaintiffs
attack them as per se illegal, charging that they have such
pernicious effects that they should be condemned without
further inquiry. If such "vertical" practices disguise a
concealed horizontal agreement among distributors, then
courts find for the plaintiffs on that basis alone. Lower courts
after Sylvania have frequently found such "horizontal-vertical"
arrangements and applied theper se rule based on the purpose
of the practices. If the practices were designed to further a
manufacturer's business strategy for rationalized distribution,
they are considered purely vertical; if the practices were
adopted as a result of anticompetitive distributor coercions,
however, they are found to cover collusive activities among
distributors.
Before applying the per se rule, some courts apply the
Supreme Court standards established in the group boycott
context, which require the existence of a wide combination of
distributors collectively furthering their anticompetitive
purposes.9" Thus, an agreement among two or more
distributors, who subsequently seek and obtain from their
supplier a contractual or other commitment for exclusivity or
protection from intrabrand competition, and who occasionally
force the supplier to refuse to do business with or terminate
some of the distributors' competitors, clearly meets this group
boycott "plurality" requirement. 10 0
796 F.2d at 1225-26; Calculators Hawaii, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 724 F.2d 1332,
1338 (9th Cir. 1983); Products Liab. Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins.
Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1982); A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co.,
653 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1981); Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat
Distribs., 637 F.2d 1376, 1387 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Elder-Beerman
Stores v. Federated Dep't Stores, 459 F.2d 138, 144-45, 149 (6th Cir. 1972);
Cherokee Labs., Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Servs., 383 F.2d 97, 105 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"' See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959).
10 See Big Apple BMW v. BMW of N. Am., 974 F.2d 1358, 1372 (3d Cir.
1992); ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., 939 F.2d 547, 556-57 (8th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1176 (1992). In other cases, courts found that the
"plurality" requirement was not satisfied. See Key Fin. Planning Corp. v.
ITT Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 641-42 (10th Cir. 1987); Lomar Wholesale
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Alternatively, some courts hold that arrangements
involving distributors who have a veto power over the
appointment of prospective applicants are horizontal and thus
per se illegal. In those decisions, the fact that distributors
may exclude intrabrand competition at will is considered
particularly dangerous.10'
Finally, a group of decisions holds that restrictions which
are vertical in form might in reality be horizontal in nature
when their source is a distributor whose interests clearly are
being served (rather than that of the instituting
manufacturer).10' The fact that consultations or complaints
Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 591 (8th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); Carlson Mach. Tools, Inc. v.
American Tool, Inc., 678 F.2d 1253, 1260 (5th Cir. 1982).
But see Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168-70 (3d
Cir. 1979). Cernuto, a distributor, had been terminated, and one of its
competitors had been granted an exclusive distributorship. Cernuto set a
dual standard to determine when horizontal action exists in distributor
terminations or similar situations: (1) the manufacturer should have
received complaints from a distributor, and, actingin concert with it, should
have refused to deal with one of its competitors or have granted it exclusive
rights; and (2) the purpose and effect of the challenged conduct should be to
restrain price competition between the complaining distributor and its
terminated competitors. The Cernuto standard therefore covered situations
where only one distributor was pressuring a supplier for anticompetitive
purposes, i.e., where Klor's did not apply. Other lower court decisions
refined the Cernuto standard by conditioning horizontal action upon a
finding of causality between the complaints and the termination and upon
evidence that the manufacturer had acted "but for" the complaints. See,
e.g., Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1499-1501 (3d Cir.
1985); Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, 719 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir.
1983).
This holding and other precedents following Cernuto, were overruled by
the Supreme Court in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,
485 U.S. 717, 723-31 (1988). In Business Electronics, the Court held that
the characterization of distributor violations as per se illegal antitrust
offenses may eventually penalize perfectly legitimate manufacturer
behavior. Id. at 728.
101 See Central Telecommunications v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d 711,
726-27 (8th Cir. 1986); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d
226, 236 (5th Cir. 1983); Quality Mercury Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d
466, 471 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that exclusive franchise "in perpetuity" is
suspect under the Sherman Act), cert. denied sub nom., Prestige Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc. v. Quality Mercury, Inc., 433 U.S. 914 (1977); American Motor
Inns v. Holiday Inns, 521 F.2d 1230, 1242 (3d Cir. 1975).
102 See Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202, 1205
(9th Cir. 1988); General Leaseways v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744
F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1984); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise,
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from distributors may have preceded the adoption or
enforcement of a vertical scheme does not, however, suffice to
characterize the arrangement as horizontal, unless it is proven
that the distributor has coerced the manufacturer to act
against its will. As noted in Sylvania, the per se rule can be
applied only upon demonstrable economic effect and not upon
the basis of formalistic line drawing.
4.5. Conclusion: The Market Power and Interbrand
Competition Approach Versus the Intrabrand Competition and
Parallel Import Approach
4.5.1. The Strength of the Market Power Approach
Assuming that manufacturers are profit maximizers and
that the market is a self-correcting mechanism that effectively
penalizes businesses which further non-efficiency goals,'0 3
U.S. theorists belonging to the Chicago School of thought view
exclusive distributorships and concomitant vertical territorial
restrictions on distributors as efficiency-enhancing schemes,
which rarely raise antitrust concerns. Particularly in
industries that are not concentrated and where interbrand
competition is vigorous, a producer lacking market power may
not risk insulating its distributors from intrabrand competition
and thus risk giving distributors supracompetitive profits
without providing an objectively justifiable reason. Higher
distributor prices may deter consumers from buying the
producer's goods and force consumers toward alternative
commodities. Accepting the truth of this hypothesis, it is
possible that such a producer is seeking to further its
legitimate interests in improved distribution. The market
power and interbrand competition approach thus furnishes a
simple and time-saving standard, which can be easily applied
by judges unfamiliar with complex economic theories.
Furthermore, this approach does not require an elaborate
analysis of the confusing points presented by controversial
exclusive and territorial agreements. While acknowledging
that exclusive and vertical territorial schemes may be
686 F.2d 1190, 1197-99 (6th Cir. 1982); Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid
Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir. 1981).
103 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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anticompetitive in situations in which a high percentage of
manufacturer power and industry concentration exist, this
approach suggests that such schemes deserve protection when
they benefit manufacturers, distributors and consumers.
4.5.2. Weakness of the Intrabrand Competition and
Parallel Import Approach
In contrast to these U.S. approaches, E.U. officials show
marked hostility toward practices which completely eliminate
intrabrand competition within a single distribution network.
While generally protecting pure exclusive distributorships, as
demonstrated by the provisions of Regulation 83/83, these
officials generally outlaw territorial schemes which further
shield exclusive distributors, from trade activities originating
outside their territories. Similarly, although the Regulation
permits the inclusion of some mild territorial restrictions in
the exclusive contract, it outlaws more intense intrabrand
restrictions. Such restrictions are driven by valid but
excessive concerns, namely, that the obstruction of parallel
imports among traders from different Member States, which
is one specific form of intrabrand rivalry, will prevent the
equalization of differentiated national prices and hinder the
unification of the E.U. market. These restrictive policies
neglect, however, the proper appraisal of the competitive
conditions within the relevant market in which the contested
territorial schemes are instituted. Instead, the Commission
and the European Court of Justice confine themselves to a
short-sighted assessment of the impact of the airtight
territorial restrictions. As a result, both the Commission and
the Court of Justice penalize conduct that might otherwise be
perfectly legitimate. These penalties deter businesses from
exercising the necessary control over their distribution
channels, from creating or maintaining a superior image for
their brand, and from enhancing their competitive status.
Viewing the specific forms of intrabrand restrictions as non-
exempted violations of E.U. competition law may decrease-
rather than increase-competition in the interbrand market in
the long run.'" The manufacturer market power and
104 The idea that scrutiny of intense intrabrand restrictions in the
European Union is conducted narrowly and without the required market
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interbrand competition test, therefore, provides a more
accurate and balanced standard by which to evaluate
restricted distribution practices.
4.5.3. Similarities Between Exclusive Distributorships and
the Absolute Territorial Protection of Distributors
The condemnation of the absolute territorial protection of
distributors alone, and not of other milder forms of intrabrand
restrictions or exclusive distributorships, demonstrates that
E.U. authorities distinguish between exemptible and non-
exemptible schemes based on the intensity of each intrabrand
restriction, irrespective of their similar nature and analogous
use by manufacturers. If, as the Chicago School theory
mandates, the underlying rationale for upholding exclusive
and mild territorial restrictions is to organize effective and
competitive distribution networks, then the same holds true
for the absolute territorial protection of distributors. Once
substance is selected over form as the basis for antitrust
evaluations, and given that "manufacturers have an economic
interest in maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is
consistent with the efficient distribution of their products," it
follows that any distinction between exclusive distributorships
or "qualified" territorial restraints is unwarranted, absent
significant manufacturer market power or substantial industry
concentration. 1 5 On the other hand, as will be shown,
concerns about absolute territorial protection as a symptom
indicative of a segregated E.U. market may be ill-founded.
Such concerns focus more on the immediate effects of
territorial protection, such as the preservation of differentiated
pricing throughout the European Union, rather than on the
potential role of protection as a tool by which to promote more
effective competition and expansion of national manufacturers
analysis is supported by various commentators. See KORAH & ROTHNIE,
supra note 27, at 26, 31-33; Chard, supra note 1, at 435-36; Gyselen, supra
note 1, at 658-62,; Hawk, supra note 1, at 72; Van Bael, supra note 1, at 43,
48, 56. As noted by these commentators, restrictions on intrabrand
competition should be appraised in connection with the surrounding
economic realitites (e.g., in support of vigorous interbrand competition).
"s See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The rule of reason
standard was established in the Sylvania decision without any distinction
being drawn between variations of the basic vertical non-price model.
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from Member State to Member State.
5. THE INCORPORATION OF U.S. VIEWS INTO EUROPEAN
EXCLUSIVE AND RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION LAW:
VIABLE SOLUTIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF THE
E.U. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
This section explores the feasibility of applying the
economic "efficiency" and "market structure" theories, widely
endorsed by U.S. courts, to the E.U. exclusive and vertical
territorial controversies. As already discussed, these theories
seek to protect the manufacturers' desire for improved
distribution, without jeopardizing the welfare of ultimate
consumers."°6 Whether the application of the "efficiency"
and "market structure" theories in practice does not impede
the realization of the E.U.'s principal goals for competition
law, such as the unification of the European market, is a
somewhat more complex issue."0 7 It will be demonstrated,
however, that the "efficiency" and "market structure"
approaches protect exclusive and vertical territorial practices
only when they foster this goal. Thus, what has been
advocated in the United States, a slightly different
environment in which the market is already integrated and
not composed of distinct countries with distribution networks
organized along national lines, may fertilize European thought
and therefore deserves more than immediate dismissal by E.U.
officials.
The proposal made in this section, inspired by U.S. theories
and precedents, can be successfully reconciled with the dual
substance of Article 85, which includes the bifurcated
allocation of duties between the Commission and the national
judiciary of Member States, 08 as well as the differing
economic realities of the European Union (e.g., national
monopolies, frequent collusive phenomena, and barriers to
entry and exit) and U.S. markets.0 9 Because E.U. officials
might, at first, be reluctant to accept the usefulness of this
106 See supra Sections 4.1-4.2.
107 See supra Section 2.
108 See supra Section 3.1.
See infra Section 5.1. See, e.g., KoRAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at
23-24; Waelbroeck, supra note 1, at 49.
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proposal, an amendment to Regulation 83/83 would be
worthwhile in order to accommodate the immediate needs of
private parties.1 Once established as feasible, the ideas
suggested in this proposal will lead the Commission and the
Court of Justice to analyze exclusive and restricted territorial
distribution controversies under a revised set of standards, as
demonstrated by a concrete application of U.S. precedents in
factual circumstances already prevalent in Europe."'
5.1. The Proposal Modeled on U.S. Theories and Precedents
5.1.1. The Proposal: The Market Power Filter and the
Different Interpretation of Article 85. The Rule of Reason
Under 85(1)
As already demonstrated, adoption of the U.S. "market
structure" approach may improve the short-sighted evaluation
of intense vertical territorial schemes by E.U. authorities.
This subsection will explore suggestions for the successful
adaptation of the "market structure" approach within the
European Union, while the next subsection will examine the
approach with respect to its compatibility with the market
integration objective.
This incorporation of U.S. ideas within the European Union
would mean a radical change for E.U. competition law.
Furthermore, it would mandate the assessment of intrabrand
territorial restrictions under Article 85 within the correct
market context, irrespective of the intensity of the restrictions.
To this end, Europeans should utilize a Rule of Reason
analysis under Article 85(1), thereby recognizing that not
every scheme which protects distributor territories from
intrusions mechanically falls within its scope." 2 Along with
agreements adopted due to concerted distributor pressures,
"1 See infra Section 5.2.
... See infra Section 5.3.
"' Viewing the rule of reason through a comparative perspective,
Professor Joliet was the first to support the idea of such a rule. See Joliet
supra note 1; see also KORAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at 48-50 (arguing
that such a policy may grant to exclusive distributors the amount of
protection required for the recoupment of their investments); Hawk, supra
note 1, at 72 (noting the need for insertion of a U.S.-type Rule of Reason in
this paragraph of Article 85).
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which should be treated under a strict per se rule,"3
intrabrand restrictions adopted by powerful manufacturers
facing limited interbrand competition and operating in
concentrated industries would be considered potentially
dangerous. In such cases, the Commission and the Court of
Justice would intervene to examine whether, on balance, the
overall anticompetitive effect is outweighed by any
procompetitive justifications or efficiencies. Under this new
interpretation of Article 85(1), the requirements of Article
85(3) would be met, although in a more "relaxed" version.
According to economic theory and experience, a manufacturer
who lacks market power does not risk giving supracompetitive
profits to its distributors when the manufacturer includes in
its distribution contract clauses "not indispensable," with the
hope of attaining an improvement in distribution or another
efficiency objective. Furthermore, one cannot argue that
consumers themselves would be harmed as a result of such
restrictions. The somewhat higher distributor prices may
deprive consumers of a "fair share" in terms of price, but
consumers may gain an advantage from the non-price
efficiencies that result from the restrictions (e.g., service and
preservation of high product quality) which do not currently
factor into official E.U. fair share antitrust analyses. Higher
prices may reflect the costs necessary to achieve those
distribution efficiencies rather than supracompetitive
distribution margins, which may be unlikely because of
existing interbrand competition." 4
With the introduction of such new standards, a plaintiff,
upon proof of an agreement or other concerted practice
between a manufacturer and any of its direct or indirect
purchasers, would have to produce further evidence concerning
the degree of manufacturer market power. For this purpose,
11 See supra Section 4.2.
114 For a generous interpretation of the requirements under Article 85(3),
see DeKeyser, supra note 51, at 290-93; Deringer, supra note 51, at 613-20.
Mere relaxation of the conditions, however, would not remedy the
current defects of the European policy. If Article 85(1) were continually
applied under a mechanical approach, almost all vertical territorial
arrangements would be in violation of it. As a result, the arrangements
would be saved only by a formal individual exemption granted by the
Commission. Parties would thus experience the same problems of delay and
uncertainty that they currently face. See supra Section 3.1.2.
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the relevant product and geographic market must be defined.
Although frequently perceived as subject to manipulation by
litigants advocating a specific outcome, the relevant product
and geographic markets may be verified through a series of
pervasive tests, such as purchasing patterns, price levels,
transportation costs, etc. After defining the relevant markets,
the manufacturer's market share or the differentiation level
characterizing the manufacturer's product should be
calculated." 5 These factors should be supplemented by
considerations including the level of concentration in the
relevant market and the degree to which that market is
covered by such intense territorial practices. Manufacturer
market shares below 20% (the level largely followed in U.S.
cases concerning vertical non-price restrictions), low
concentration levels (denoted by an HHI below 1,000), and
limited coverage of the relevant market by analogous practices
should all lead to the rejection of the plaintiff's claims."'
'5 See 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 351-66 (1978).
The definition of the relevant market may include substitutes in
consumption and production and fringe firms, according to the Landes/
Posner definition. See Landes & Posner, supra note 90, at 944-51, 960-67.
The geographic market may include output by foreign manufacturers of
substitute goods which respond to any price increase and attempt to import
into the contract territory of distributors in a Member State. See George
Hay, et al., Geographic Market Definition in an International Context, 1990
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 67-73 (1991); see also Merger Guidelines of the
United States Department of Justice, 4 TRADE REG. REP. 20,573 (1992)
[hereinafter Merger Guidelines] (referring to the "small but significant and
non-transitory" increase in price as a tool for defining relevant markets).
"' See supra Section 4.4; see also Merger Guidelines, supra note 115, at
20,573-5 to 20,573-6. The Herfildahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated
by summing the squares of the shares of all competitors in the market, and
thus demonstrates the levels of concentration among the top four firms, in
comparison to the shares of the smaller firms in it. A market with an HHI
below 1,000 is usually considered as unconcentrated, with an HHI between
1,000 and 1,800 as moderately concentrated, and with an HHI above 1,800
as highly concentrated. In situations of absolute monopoly, when a single
firm holds a 100% market share, the HHI is equal to 10,000. The "degree
of market coverage by analogous agreements" is also discussed in a few
decisions of the European Court of Justice, but reference to it is coincidental
and fragmentary. See Case 75/84, Metro SB-GrossmArkte GmbH v. Comm'n,
1986 E.C.R. 3021, 3085, 1 C.M.L.R. 118 (1987); Case 23/67, S.A. Brasserie
de Haecht v. Wilkin, 1967 E.C.R. 407, 414-15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8,053 (1971); Case 56/65, Soci~t6 Technique Minibre v. Maschinebau Ulm
GmbH, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 260, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8,047 (1966);
Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, art. 16, 1986 O.J. (C 231).
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Since this whole analysis would be conducted under Article
85(1), national judges would, according to the third paragraph
of Article 9 of Council Regulation 17/62, be empowered to
apply the Rule of Reason in practice, thereby protecting most
of the vertical territorial arrangements brought before the
court. Thus, in the event that U.S. approaches are adopted by
the European Union, restricted distribution disputes would be
quickly resolved, and parties would be relieved of the burden
of notifying the Commission of their arrangements and waiting
for extended periods of time for the Commission's response.
The Commission, on the other hand, would not only be relieved
of many currently excessive duties, but it also would need to
scrutinize only the small number of truly dangerous restricted
distribution arrangements either found in violation of Article
85(1) by national judges or notified to the Commission for
individual exemptions under Article 85(3). In such cases, the
burden of proof rests with the defendant private parties. Such
defendants would be required to demonstrate that insertion of
such clauses in distribution arrangements is necessary for
valid and legitimate business purposes." 7
This shift of responsibilities to national courts would not
jeopardize the uniform application or interpretation of
competition law throughout the European Union. Although it
is possible that national judges might make contradictory
evaluations- especially in marginal cases that approach the
minimum power market percentage-the Commission could
exercise some control over the courts, at least in the initial
stages of applying the proposed approach. Furthermore, the
Commission could cooperate with the courts evaluating
contested legal or economic data. l"8  On the other hand, if
doubts arise as to the interpretation of Article 85(1), national
judges would be able to exercise the discretion granted by
Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome and turn to the Court of
"' See supra Section 4.4 (describing the allocation of the burden of proof
in U.S. lower court cases).
11 See Delimitis v. Henninger Brau, 1991 E.C.R. 935, 5 C.M.L.R. 2101
(1992). Although discussion in this decision mainly refers to cases in which
the Commission is notified of such agreements, it may also apply even in the
absence of notification. See also KORAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at 44-46
(discussing the breakdown of the notification procedure). The cooperation of
the Commission and courts may plausibly take the form of a short
commentary offering advice.
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Justice for advice.
5.1.2. The Institutional Goal of Market Integration and the
Proposal Reconciled
The principal objection an E.U. official would most likely
assert against this proposal concerns the focus upon the
market integration objective. If parallel importers, the
"heroes""9 who effect highly desirable price equalization of
goods in the twelve Member States, were eventually cut off
from the official distributor networks of several manufacturers,
thereby denying suppliers to these parallel importers following
the proposed exemption of many intense territorial restraints,
European markets would allegedly remain segregated. Each
appointed national exclusive distributor and other purchasers
in the vertical chain of distribution for various products would
then be able to charge differentiated prices without being
subject to intrabrand competition from other Member States
in which identical goods of the same manufacturers are
cheaper. Rather than negatively interfering with market
integration, it will be demonstrated that the adoption of the
proposal would instead generate opportunities for fostering
market integration. The only difference between the
hypothesis described by E.U. authorities and the one suggested
in the proposed approach is that of the distribution level at
which the integration takes place. European officials may
wish that integration is achieved due to the existence of
parallel imports, which equalize the resale prices of national
distributors of manufacturers, i.e., at an intrabrand level.
Nonetheless, integration may eventually be prevented at the
interbrand level as more entrepreneurs think carefully before
expanding operations into different Member States120 or
selectively operating in only a few other states in order to
1'9 See KoRAH & RoTHNIE, supra note 27, at 23; Gyselen, supra note 1,
at 649; Hawk, supra note 1, at 75; Van Bael, supra note 1, at 39. See also
Commission Regulation 1983/83, 1983 O.J. (L 173) at 1-2 (Recitals 7 and 11).
.20 See, e.g., KORAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at 15-16 (advocating the
ex ante/ex post distinction in the context of exclusive distribution). The fact
that the Commission and the Court of Justice scrutinize and outlaw vertical
practices after the distributors' investments have been made (expost) leads
them to overlook the fact that such investments would not have been made
without vertical restrictions protecting the distributors' territories (ex ante).
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avoid opportunistic activities within their distribution
networks.
The major flaw in the decisions of European agencies on
individual restricted distribution cases and of the "blacklisted"
provisions of Regulation 83/83 is that they all focus on the
phenomenon of differential pricing throughout the Union
without any reference to the underlying reasons for such
variations. This policy may give an advantage only to parallel
importers while harming both manufacturers and official
distributors. Unless the different conditions causing the price
variations are assimilated and other differences in economic
conditions in the various Member States cease to exist, the
equalization of prices in the abstract may have no rational
basis. This is especially true with regard to external
conditions, which manufacturers and their distributors are
unable to control. In addition, different promotional costs,
required levels of investment for successful operation in
national markets, national government measures, rates of
inflation and national currency fluctuations are all outside
their control. Other factors that are closely related to the
manufacturer's own behavior and deliberate tactics and
account for variations in national pricing (e.g., price
discrimination following different levels of demand and other
competitive situations throughout the Union, the institution of
predatory pricing in specific Member States, varying degrees
of efficiency in distribution of a manufacturer's goods from
Member State to Member State) are generally incompatible
with the proposed market power filter. 2'
Assume, first, that the exclusive distributor of a business
in country A has to incur higher distribution costs than
exclusive distributors in other Member States.'22  The
difference may be explained by a need for heavy advertising in
one country in order to inform local consumers, who currently
demonstrate strong loyalty to other competitive goods, about
the products. The difference can also be explained by the
existence of high minimum wages or salaries controlled by
collective bargaining agreements, which generate higher costs
for hiring employees and workers during the time needed to
, See Waelbroeck, supra note 1, at 51.
12 See Chard, supra note 1, at 435.
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organize and oversee a viable distribution network. Finally,
the difference can be explained by the need to purchase or
lease various commodities or real property for the successful
organization of such a network.
Suppose next that an exclusive distributor or another
trader from country B, where minimal advertising is required
and where wages or other costs of distribution are lower,
decides to sell in country A at correspondingly low prices,
without paying for any advertising, by hiring the smallest
possible number of employees and operating from a rented
warehouse in a low-income area. This is a classic case in
which the difference in prices is justified by external factors
and an objective discrepancy between operation costs in
different Member States easily creates free rider problems. If
parallel trade is left free, some distributors may be reluctant
to carry a supplier's line in those countries where distribution
expenses are substantially higher than in others. The supplier
may then decide not to enter that specific high-priced market
at all, or it may decide to withdraw completely from the low-
priced market.
Alternatively, the tax structure and relevant statutory
provisions of a Member State may make it compulsory for
distributors operating therein to pay high taxes that are not
required in other Member States. Distributors or resellers in
those other Member States may occasionally import there,
incurring only a portion of the total costs that the local
distributor has incurred and thus undercutting it. Monetary
exchange fluctuations and inflation rates are also significant
in this regard. Parallel imports into a country in which the
national currency has been recently devalued or in which
inflation rates have skyrocketed are extremely profitable. This
is especially true for imports from countries with very strong
currencies and low inflation in which identical goods are sold
at lower prices. As a result, the local distributor in a high-
priced market may eventually stop selling the manufacturer's
product, and the manufacturer may accordingly plan to
withdraw from that market. National tax laws, currency, and
inflation matters are examples of other conditions beyond the
control of manufacturers and distributors. These factors also
objectively differentiate the status of distributors in different
Member States and enable parallel importers to make easy
profits by taking advantage of the expenses incurred by the
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less-favored national distributors.
Manufacturers operating in more than one Member State
may decide to charge their distributors-and, hence, their
ultimate consumers-varying prices. They may be responding
either to the different levels of national competition or to
different elasticities of demand. Alternatively, they may
choose to lower their prices considerably in one Member State
in order to exclude their competitors from that market
unlawfully in an attempt to create a monopoly. Under those
circumstances, the variation in prices is not due to conditions
beyond the control of the manufacturer or its distributors, but
it is in fact the result of the manufacturer's own policy. The
same is true in a third case in which a single manufacturer
deliberately appoints distributors of various efficiency levels in
different Member States. Would free trade be beneficial in
those situations? Should restricted distribution schemes
therefore be prohibited? As will be made clear, if the
manufacturer has little market power and other favorable
market conditions in the proposed model exist, it is unlikely
that the price differentials will be preserved. In the first case,
the manufacturer charges higher prices, which are passed on
by the distributors and other resellers to the ultimate
consumers in a specific Member State because competition is
not as vigorous there as it is in other countries in which price
levels are lower. Thus, local consumers have no choice but to
buy the manufacturer's goods at relatively unfavorable terms.
The manufacturer is thus discriminating in pricing by
charging consumers according to their elasticities, without
regard to any cost discrepancies from one Member State to the
other. Such manufacturers tend to prevent arbitrage from one
country to the other by protecting the high-priced distributor
territories through vertical practices. In the meantime, cross-
trade may assimilate prices from territory to territory and
diminish the manufacturer's own profits as a result.
The successful implementation of such a scheme, however,
is based on the hypothesis that the manufacturer faces a
relatively inelastic market demand in the protected, high-
priced territory, making it incompatible with the proposed
market power model. By contrast, an elastic state of demand
would imply that the manufacturer lacked the ability to charge
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such high prices.123 Below the market structure levels
suggested in the proposal (20% market share, 1,000 HHI), the
divergence of discriminatory national prices that are not cost-
justifiable may not generate profitable cross-trade, especially
in view of the transportation costs from one country to
another. Only small national price differences may occur, as
is also true in fully integrated markets such as that of the
United States.
In the second case, the manufacturer will try either to
enter a new national market or to reinforce an existing
powerful market position in a Member State and thus exclude
its other competitors from that state by charging substantially
lower prices through its distributors, occasionally below
average variable cost.124 This strategy is usually followed by
manufacturers trying to recoup their losses by charging
supracompetitive prices in the specific market in which the
exclusion is likely to occur or in other markets in which they
are already powerful enough to extract high profits. In the
latter case, these markets (which might coincide with two
Member States) must be artificially isolated with absolute
territorial protection schemes. If cross-trading occurs, not only
will the predator be unable to fund the below-cost prices in the
low-priced country, but its distributors in the high-priced
country will also be required to sell at a loss. This situation
is also incompatible with the proposed model. Losses incurred
through predatory behavior may only be recouped in markets
in which the predator enjoys a quasi-monopoly or in which the
barriers to entry are extremely high. The proposed model,
however, suggests that the absolute territorial protection of
distributors is immunized only when relatively small
manufacturers operate in markets where interbrand
123 For the correlations among demand elasticity of the market, demand
elasticity of the firm, and market power, see Landes & Posner, supra note
90, at 939-52.
124 See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697,
716 (1975); Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing:
Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 738, 751 (1981); Joel B. Dirlam, Marginal Cost Pricing
Tests for Predation: Naive Welfare Economics and Public Policy, 26
ANTITRUST BULL. 769, 774 (1981); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A
Framework forAnalyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213,219-20
(1979).
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competition is strong. Unfortunately, attacking the symptom
of differential pricing-and not the conditions that brought it
about-is harmful to the predator's distributors. Rather than
attacking vertical territorial restrictions that preserve price
differences, predatory pricing itself should be attacked as a
potentially anticompetitive practice.
Finally, the prices of the manufacturer's goods throughout
the European Union may be different, depending upon the
efficiency level of its various national distributors, the level of
technological development and organizational experience, and
the suitability of its methodology.12  Less efficient
distributors have higher costs and charge local consumers
more. Furthermore, the thrust of paiallel imports may make
their survival improbable. The protection of these distributors
against parallel imports is not, however, in the manufacturer's
best interest. In the presence of strong interbrand
competition, manufacturers may either leave intrabrand
competition free to put pressure on the distributors and force
them to increase their efficiency or terminate those
distributors in favor of better-equipped competitors with lower
operating costs. Restricted distribution schemes that
perpetuate national price differences are thus unlikely to be
explained by different degrees of distribution efficiency.
Adopting a U.S.-type standard for evaluating intense
vertical territorial restrictions in the European Union,
however, would neither create artificial barriers for European
markets nor perpetuate the existing European markets. First,
these vertical schemes would not be adopted to make price
discrimination or predatory pricing more effective or to shield
inefficient national distributors from intrabrand competition.
Second, integration would be fostered in all other cases in
which distribution protection is justified on grounds of
differentiated distribution costs or other variable conditions.
Leaving parallel trade free in this instance may only support
parasitic activities which harm established local distributors
and operate as a counter-incentive for businesses to expand in
the territories of Member States. These activities force
businesses either to withdraw from low-priced markets or to
125 Note that this assumes that there are no differentiated levels of
efficiency in production among the Member States of the European Union.
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establish uniform increased prices throughout the European
Union in an effort to discourage interstate trade.126
5.1.3. Vertical Integration as a Threat to European
Unification
A European business instructed by the Commission that it
must abandon all measures designed to protect one or more of
its distributors against parallel imports may create its own
subsidiaries responsible for the promotion of its products in
the national markets of various Member States (i.e., by
expanding internally). In order to avoid future violations of
Article 85(1), the business will undoubtedly integrate vertically
with one of the distributors already operating at the
downstream level. Indeed, the provisions of this article are
only applicable to "agreements between undertakings." Any
decisions made by units operating within the internal
structure of a single enterprise are necessarily outside its
ambit."7 A manufacturer expanding internally or externally
is thus able either to limit the territorial scope within which
each of its vertical branches is allowed to operate or to police
its strategies without risking antitrust liability. 2  The
manufacturer may also benefit from other advantages usually
attributed to vertical integration, such as optimal internal firm
organization, effective flow of information between different
126 On the other hand, the opposite stance may not only assist European
integration, but also may enable European businesses to enhance their
competitive position in the international markets. See Douglas E.
Rosenthal, Competition Policy, in Europe 1992: An American Perspective
293, 329-30 (Gary C. Hufbauer ed., 1990); see also Daniel Oliver, Antitrust
as a 1992 Fortress WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1989, at A14 (noting that the EEC
antitrust policy has as its primary goals the unification of the European
economy and the protection and promotion of competition).
127 Commercial agency is an alternative measure that serves purposes
similar to vertical integration. Since commercial agents are traders who
negotiate and conclude transactions on behalf of their principals without
assuming any personal financial risks, contracts concluded between the two
are not covered by 85(1). See Commission's Notice on Agency, J.O. 2961/62.
The criteria used by the Commission and the Court to determine whether
there is an agency agreement vary from case to case. In addition, the
parties sometimes may remain uncertain whether their arrangements are
governed by 85(1). See, e.g., Decision de la Commission IV 26876, 1972 J.O.
(L 272) 35, 38; Commission Regulation 476/88, 1988 O.J. (L 49) 1, 19, 20.
128 See KoRAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at 5; WHISH, supra note 14, at
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divisions, and prompt control and decision-making on
distribution matters.129
If vertical integration patterns are the only legitimate
means of protecting distributors' investments, however, they
may adversely affect not only efficiency but also the successful
implementation of European unification. First, vertical
integration is, by definition, a very costly means of
distributional organization. Consequently, many enterprises
find vertical integration of limited success, especially those
companies that lack the necessary experience to organize their
internal expansion in an appropriate manner. Thus, the
condemnation of absolute territorial protection schemes may
not only preclude expansion of the European market, but it
may also prevent the vertical growth of individual Member
State enterprises. These protection schemes will, in turn,
deter both competition and European integration.
Second, the diseconomy that may occasionally result from
vertical integration may make it more difficult for European
firms to penetrate national markets. Vertical internal
expansion, which requires the establishment of a new
subsidiary, deprives entrepreneurs of the benefit of core
competencies and other economies of scale and scope already
developed by existing independent firms involved in the local
distribution business. Local distributors, which either use
tested and successful methods designed to meet the needs of
consumers in their own Member State or invent ways to
operate at a substantially lower cost, have a competitive
advantage over less industrial distributors. A manufacturer
who decides to establish a subsidiary in a specific Member
State which is ill-equipped to understand the local market or
which functions at a higher cost than the distributors of other
interbrand competitors will lose its competitive advantage.'
Vertical integration may therefore be an ineffective means of
129 See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 68,.at 544; Williamson, supra
note 68, at 969-72.
130 See KORAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at 4 (stating that vertical
integration within a firm is not always efficient). Since the staff of the
subsidiary distribution firm is composed of manufacturer employees, they
are protected by national labor laws and thus may be dismissed only under
certain limited circumstances. This holds true even if they are responsible
for substantial inefficiencies in the functioning of the subsidiary vis-A-vis
other competitors in the local market.
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penetrating the European market and thus for the general
development of interstate trade."'
Unfortunately, once vertical integration has commenced, it
will automatically end all intrabrand competition within the
manufacturer's own distributional network. Vertical branches
of a single firm will no longer compete among themselves. By
attacking vertical integration, European officials may have as
their main goal the elimination of national price differences
resulting from intrabrand trade. Businesses which choose
internal growth as an alternative solution to serve their needs
without exposing themselves to liabilities may, however, be
surprised at the results. Such growth will likely perpetuate
individual differences and ultimately thwart the attainment of
the goal of European market integration.
5.1.4. The Distributors' Cartel Hypothesis in the E.U.
Vertical Context
The proposal for a new model of evaluation for restricted
distribution in the European Union would be incomplete if it
did not exempt from its general formula those cases involving
market- dividing aspirations of distributors, restricted output,
and impaired consumer welfare. In such cases, intense
vertical territorial restrictions are not instituted to serve the
interests of European business. These interests include
increased efficiency, preservation of brand image and
characteristics, and elimination of free-rider and other
parasitic activities.'32 It is true, however, that abundant
evidence is required to support the condemnation of a
supposed vertical scheme as horizontal. In the absence of such
proof, otherwise legitimate activity may be penalized. 33
' The same is true when manufacturers have bought most of the
successful distribution firms. The remaining enterprises may subsequently
be unable to use the facilities of those firms, and they will probably be
hampered from entering specific national markets on an efficient scale. See
generally Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert, Vertical Integration As a Threat to
Competition: Airline Computer Reservation Systems, in The Antitrust
Revolution 338, 349-51 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989)
(noting that the exclusive use of computer reservation systems on two
airline companies was an impediment to competition in the long run).
"3 But see Waelbroeck, supra note 1, at 48 (contending that the
distinction is unworkable).
13 See supra Section 4 (discussing the "plurality" and the "source of the
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Neither Regulation 83/83 nor the individual decisions of the
Commission and the Court of Justice, however, seem to be
particularly concerned with such horizontal practices. In fact,
Article 1 of the Regulation requires that only two parties may
enter into an exclusive distribution agreement free from
exemption. M The Commission presumably fears that if
more than two firms or undertakings (i.e., a manufacturer and
numerous distributors) sign an exclusive contract, all
distributors who are party to the agreement may then
purchase from the manufacturer on equal terms, thereby
enabling them to resell without competing among themselves.
Differentiated pricing would allegedly make it more difficult
for these distributors to coordinate their anticompetitive
activities. Article 1, however, remains inadequate because it
catches true "vertical-horizontal" restrictions only incidentally.
The proof of horizontal action is not inextricably related to the
equal treatment of distributors in a single contract. Identical
purchase terms may indeed facilitate the implementation of a
distributors cartel. Nevertheless, even in their absence, cartel
members may coordinate and collude. Furthermore, despite
the equal purchase terms, such a joint exclusive distribution
agreement may be completely legitimate.
Similarly, the Commission's decision falls short because it
fails to examine whether the challenged absolute territorial
protection schemes are horizontally initiated. This trend may
be partly explained by the fact that antitrust complaints in
those cases are submitted by "outsiders" or third parties. This
latter group includes prospective parallel importers, which
officially appointed resellers in the manufacturing network
have refused to supply, and which therefore have no access to
inside information concerning potential anticompetitive
restraint" requirements). On the other hand, the importance of the
"horizontal]vertical" distinction is not disturbed by the fact that the
successful implementation of any horizontal action depends on manufacturer
market power. In the absence of the latter, combinations of distributors or
cartels will not be able to extract supracompetitive profits from consumers.
The anticompetitive results of the horizontal division of markets among
distributors are such that relevant instances occasionally must be examined
on their own merits.
134 See KORAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at 73-75; Schroter, supra note
28, at 398 (stating that "[tihe block exemption covers only agreements to
which not more than two undertakings are party") (citation omitted).
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schemes secretly implemented among those resellers.
Alternatively, this lack of information may stem from the fact
that the scrutiny of specific cases follows official notification of
agreements by the manufacturers themselves. These
manufacturers then intentionally fail to inform the
Commission of such matters due to their understandable
concern that the illegal clauses will void the whole distribution
agreement.
3 5
The introduction of the "vertical-horizontal" distinction in
the proposed model is indispensable. It may not only lead to
the per se condemnation of those cases in which the
manufacturer is manipulated and consumers are harmed, but
it may also penalize abuses against European market
integration itself. "Vertical-horizontal" schemes do not aim to
promote business efficiency, and they do not serve as a tool for
entrepreneurs expanding their operations across national
territories to further European unification. Instead, they are
designed to perpetuate the fragmentation of the Common
Market among exclusive distributors.
5.2. The Proposed Amendment of Regulation No. 83/83
The prospective admission of the rule of reason standard
under 85(1) in European restricted distribution controversies
raises an additional issue: the future applicability of
Regulation 83/83. Although the Regulation will expire at the
end of 1997, it is now valid and fully enforced by the
Commission and national judicial authorities. Assuming that
the proposed approach would be incorporated in European
competition law, national courts would dispose of all
agreements now covered by the Regulation as legitimate,136
rendering the Regulation obsolete. The question remains,
1" See Viho, 1992 O.J. (L 233) at 29; Tipp-Ex, 1987 O.J. (L 222) at 2;
Johnson & Johnson, 1980 O.J. (L 377) at 23 (discussing an export
prohibition clause in a contract undertaken within the meaning of Article
85(1)); see also Hennessy-Henkell, 1980 O.J. (L 383) at 13 (noting that
Hennessy informed the Commission that amendments had been made to a
previous agreement only after the Commission requested such information).
"36 There may be a few exceptions (i.e., exclusive agreements in the
networks of dominant manufacturers, now covered by the Regulation, may
potentially violate 85(1)). Nevertheless, this will be the case for only a
limited number of dangerous agreements which rise above the threshold
established in the proposal and thereby warrant the Commission's scrutiny.
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however, whether and to what extent the Commission and the
Court of Justice will shift from existing precedent and accept
the new standard. Some commentators still insist that the
Regulation is of limited value. They go on to note that E.U.
authorities allegedly display a certain willingness to apply
Article 85(1) narrowly, thereby protecting several challenged
schemes which would have violated 85(1) under the
"mechanical" rule."" Yet, the rule of reason has not yet
crystallized as a valid standard by which to analyze
agreements in the European Union.
A brief discussion of case law will better illustrate this
point regarding Regulation 83/83. On June 30, 1966, the
Court of Justice issued Socidtd Technique Minire,3 8 ruling
on a pure exclusive distribution case the same way it decided
the Delimitis"'3 case only three years ago. Although the
factual scenarios were slightly different, both decisions
required a full analysis of the particular economic and legal
issues that had been raised. Nonetheless, in the meantime,
Article 85(1) has seldom been applied to the rule of reason.
Socidtd Technique Mini~re and Delimitis may indeed be
important decisions, but under no circumstances do they signal
a change in the interpretation of Article 85. Until both the
Commission and the Court adopt a new position, intermediate
measures will be required to cover the practices of parties now
outside the Regulation. This is especially true for enterprises
which are instituting intense territorial restraints. Amending
some of the provisions of the Regulation, as well as certain
Recitals and Guidelines, may fulfill this purpose effectively
and without further unnecessary delay. Once the
interpretation of 85(1) matches the proposed model, however,
the Regulation should cease to apply.
If the U.S. "market structure" approach for evaluating
vertical territorial schemes is utilized, all proposed
amendments should necessarily refer to an explanatory
'37 See, e.g., KORAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27, at 249-50 (noting that the
sophisticated economic analysis allegedly established in 85(1) makes the
Regulation useful only rarely).
"s Case 56/65, Soci6t6 Technique Mini&re, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 250 (stating
that "Article 85(2) provides that 'Any agreements or decisions prohibited
pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.'").
13, Delimitis, 1991 E.C.R. at 963-68, 2 C.E.C. (CCH) at 563-66.
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provision added in the proposed text of the new regulation.
Furthermore, the amendments should define terms such as
"market structure," "market power," "powerful supplier," and
"high concentration among suppliers." The language of such a
provision might read as follows:
For purposes of the present Regulation, consideration
of market structure cumulatively includes assessing: (1)
the power of the supplier instituting the scrutinized
restricted distribution schemes; (2) the concentration
levels among suppliers in the relevant market; and (3)
the degree of market coverage by similar schemes
excluding other forms of distribution. Market power
might be alternatively demonstrated either by the large
share of the supplier in the relevant product and
geographic market or by the highly differentiated
character of its product; above a threshold of 20%
market share, the supplier will be presumed powerful.
High concentration among suppliers is demonstrated by
an HHI of above 1,000.
The proposed amendments are thus divided into three
categories. The first relates to provisions regulating the scope
of permissible obligations assumed by and discretion given to
a manufacturer supplying an exclusive distributor. The second
covers provisions delineating the obligations of the exclusive
distributors or resellers at subsequent trade levels. Finally,
the third amendment covers "blacklisted" provisions, which
control the behavior of parties irrespective of trade level
operations.
An amended regulation is thus necessary to curb
manufacturing practices. For instance, under the current
status quo, intrabrand activities which undermine the
exclusive distributors' investments and relate to the
manufacturers' scope of operation are encouraged under
Guideline 27. This allows the manufacturer to sell not only to
traders outside the exclusive distributor's territory but also to
those wishing to resell within the area. Guideline 30
acknowledges the manufacturer's discretion to supply products
outside the contract territory and to users based within the
region. Furthermore, Article 2 mandates that the supplier
assume no other obligations than those already listed in
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Article ."4 This provision includes a few exceptions, such
as the prohibition of cross-sales among the contract territories
of the supplier's exclusive distributors. 4' Finally, an
amended version of the regulation and guidelines should
provide for the possibility of contractual curtailment of such
activities, subject, of course, to the conditions prevalent in the
relevant market. It will only be necessary to preserve
intrabrand competition in concentrated industries, in which
only a few manufacturers enjoy large market shares.
Guidelines 27'4 and 30,1' respectively, should be modified
to read as follows:
The supplier may, however, assume the obligation not
to supply such resellers outside the contract territory, if
it is not powerful (holds a market share below 20%), the
supplier concentration levels in the relevant market are
low (HHI below 1,000), and this market is not covered
by restricted distribution schemes to an extent
excluding alternative forms of distribution.
The supplier may, however, assume the obligation not to
supply such final users outside the contract territory, if it
is not powerful (holds a market share below 20%), the
supplier concentration levels in the relevant market are
low (HHI below 1,000), and this market is not covered by
restricted distribution schemes to an extent excluding
alternative forms of distribution.
Article 2(1) should be slightly altered so that weak
manufacturers can protect their exclusive distributors against
cross-trade, free-rider activities. Following the current
language, "[alpart from the obligation referred to in Article 1
no restriction on competition shall be imposed on the
supplier,"" an additional phrase similar to the following
should be included: "Unless such a supplier is not powerful
(holds a market share below 20%), the supplier concentration
o See Commission Regulation 1983/83, art. 1, 1983 O.J. (L 173) at 2-3.
141 See supra Section 4.2.
14 See Guidelines, supra note 29, at 7.
143 Id
14" Commission Regulation 1983/83, art. 2(1), 1983 O.J. (L 173) at 2-3.
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levels in the relevant market are low (HHI below 1,000), and
the market is not covered by restricted distribution schemes
that exclude alternative forms of distribution." Nevertheless,
since this exception will refer to restrictions on intrabrand
competition that stem not from the supplier itself but rather
from other exclusive distributors, the original wording of
Article 2 should be changed. The phrase "restriction on
competition"145 (by the supplier) should be replaced by the
more general term "obligations" (of the supplier), which also
include the obligation of the supplier to impose territorial
restrictions on various exclusive distributors in its network.
Finally, the word (obligation) "imposed" 46 (on the supplier)
should be replaced by "assumed" (by the supplier), as the
former tends to designate situations in which a supplier
unwillingly accepts an obligation following pressures from the
members of a distributors cartel.
At the same time, the current version of the Regulation
encourages free rider activity. It gives free rein to exclusive
distributors or subsequent resellers to engage in
extraterritorial passive sales, 4 thus permitting both the
repackaging of contract goods by the exclusive distributor and
their resale in other Member States with higher prices. 48
Furthermore, the current regulation indirectly reduces the
scope of maximum permissible obligations of distributors and
resellers by disallowing the imposition of post-sale territorial
or price restrictions, which are designed to curtail parallel
imports.
This topic merits further discussion. First, the structure of
Article 2(2) should be slightly altered. The current text should
be preceded by the following phrase: "Unless the supplier of
an exclusive distributor is not powerful (holds a market share
below 20%), the supplier concentration levels in the relevant
market are low (HHI below 1,000) and this market is not
covered by restricted distribution schemes that exclude
alternative forms of distribution . . . ." This amendment to
Article 2 would allow a manufacturer to include in its
145 Id. at 2.
146 1&
147 See Guidelines, supra note 29, no. 28, at 10 (construing art. 2(2)(c)).
' See id., no. 9, at 8.
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exclusive agreement the clauses needed to enhance its
competitive status. This only holds true, however, as long as
the assessment of the market structure of the specific
territories sought to be protected from intrabrand competition
demonstrates that interbrand competition and viable
alternatives exist for consumers and there is no potential for
anticompetitive abuses. Second, Recital 8""9 and Guideline
17150 should be adapted accordingly to include in their text
the following language:
Restrictive obligations not mentioned in Article 2 may be
agreed upon, however, if the supplier is not powerful (holds
a market share below 20%), the supplier concentration
levels in the relevant market are low (HHI below 1,000),
and this market is not covered by restricted distribution
schemes to an extent excluding alternative forms of
distribution.
Guideline 28 should similarly provide:
Bans on passive sales are exemptible clauses if the supplier
is not powerful, the supplier concentration levels in the
relevant market are low, and this market is not covered by
restricted distribution schemes to an extent excluding
alternative forms of distribution.
By the same token, a manufacturer should have discretion
to restrict the exclusive distributor or other third parties from
repackaging its goods both for quality control reasons and to
help foster the elimination of free riders. Guideline 9 should
therefore provide:
Repackaging prohibitions imposed on the exclusive
distributors or other resellers might be included in the
exclusive contract, however, if their supplier is not
powerful (holds a market share below 20%), the supplier
concentration levels in the relevant market are low (HHI
below 1,000), and this market is not covered by restricted
distribution schemes to an extent excluding alternative
forms of distribution.
149 See Recital 8, supra note 37 at 1, 2.
15' See Guidelines, supra note 29, no. 17, at 9.
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Finally, the "blacklisted" clauses... regarding withdrawal
of the benefit of the block exemption by the Commission and
Recitals 111.2 and Guideline 32... should be conditioned on
consideration of the market structure. Parallel imports may
confer a "fair share" to consumers, but consumers may also
receive non-price benefits as a result of restricted distribution
schemes instituted by weak manufacturers in non-
concentrated industries. The current text of the "blacklisted"
provisions should also be amended to include the following
sentence:
The block exemption shall continue to apply (in cases c and
d), however, even if parallel imports are impeded, as long
as the supplier is not powerful (holds a market share below
20%), the supplier concentration levels in the relevant
market are low (HHI below 1,000), and this market is not
covered by restricted distribution schemes to an extent
excluding alternative forms of distribution.
An identical sentence should also be included at the end of
Guideline 33.1' In addition, Recital 11... should be
supplemented with the following language:
Clauses included in the agreement that discourage parallel
imports may be exemptible to the extent that the supplier
is not powerful, the supplier concentration levels in the
relevant market are low, and this market is not covered by
restricted distribution schemes to an extent excluding
alternative forms of distribution.
Similarly, Article 6(c)156 should provide:
The withdrawal will not be possible only if the supplier
is not powerful, the supplier concentration levels in the
relevant market are low, and this market is not covered
by restricted distribution schemes to an extent
... See Commission Regulation 1983/83, art. 3(c) & 3(d), 1983 O.J. (L 173)
at 3.
162 See id. at 2.
153 See Guidelines, supra note 29, at 11.
'
5 See id.
155 See Recital 11, supra, note 39 at 2.
"" See Commission Regulation 1893/83, art. 6(c), 1983 O.J. (L 173) at 4.
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excluding alternative forms of distribution.
Finally, the Regulation should include an additional article
condemning "horizontal/vertical" exclusive and territorial
arrangements. Since the distributor cartel hypothesis is also
applicable in the European context, consumers should be
protected against any manipulative practices that are
disguised by schemes presumed to be efficient and which
promote output restrictions. Furthermore, E.U. officials
should condemn practices which artificially thwart the
unification and growth of the European market.1 5 7 A future
form of the Regulation should therefore provide that:
Agreements described in Article 1 are not covered by the
present Regulation, as long as they are unwillingly adopted
by the supplier following pressures from the exclusive
distributor. Evidence supporting a causal nexus between
the pressures and the adoption of the arrangements is
necessary to establish that the supplier has acted but for
the pressures.
5.3. An Illustration of the Proposed Solutions: European
Exclusive and Restricted Distribution Under U.S. Standards
Perhaps nothing better demonstrates the function and
application of a model conceived and developed in the abstract
than its application to a specific set of facts. The decisions of
the Commission and the Court of Justice on restricted
distribution plans may provide the necessary background for
this purpose. Assuming that a U.S. judge must resolve a
dispute involved in one of the European decisions, how would
s/he draft an opinion? It is possible to predict with relative
certainty which arguments would be proffered and which
evaluative methodology would be followed because both E.U.
and U.S. precedents have occasionally governed analogous
territorial restrictions or other indirect devices used to make
them effective, 5 ' including: curtailment of the territorial
157 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
15 Both European and U.S. cases frequently cover the so-called "indirect
export bans," which, although they do not explicitly limit cross-sales among
Member States, may make them unprofitable or even unworkable in
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scope of a manufacturer's distributors;159 a manufacturer's
refusal to do business with distributors or subsequent resellers
not abiding to the challenged territorial restrictions;"6 a
second manufacturer's refusal to supply out-of-territory
resellers wishing to import the contract goods in their own
areas;.. or the obligation of importers to obtain such
supplies from their "assigned" distributors in those areas."'
practice. See Sperry New Holland, 1985 O.J. (L 376) at 24 (involving a
manufacturer penalizing his distributors for extraterritorial sales by
imposing accelerated payment of the total purchase price); Hennessy-
Henkell, 1980 O.J. (L 383) at 16-17 (holding that fixed resale prices
protected a local distributor from territorial "infiltration"); Re the
Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n, 2 C.M.L.R. 459 (1974) (noting that parallel
trade was prevented through the exercise of national trademark rights).
U.S. courts have also enforced territorial restrictions through passover
payments. See General Leaseways, Inc., 744 F.2d at 597 (holding that
franchisees not respecting a territorial restriction were denied the
opportunity to take advantage of the "reciprocal road service" provided in
their franchise agreement); Eiberger, 622 F.2d at 1078-79 (manufacturer
charged per item "warranty fee" on all sales by a distributor who sold
outside his territory); Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments,
Inc., 572 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978)
(manufacturer enforced a territorial restriction through a resale price
maintenance scheme).
69 See Miller, 2 C.M.L.R. at 336; cf. Newitt/Dunlop, 1992 O.J. (L 131) at
33; Three Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 1398 (holding that theaters in one
are can be prevented from showing same movies at the same time); Dart,
704 F.2d at 499 (allowing manufacturers to refuse to ship goods to
distributors for resale outside their territories).
160 See, e.g., Tipp-Ex, 1987 O.J. (L 222) at 5; Cf. Graphic Prods., 717 F.2d
at 1578 (discussing whether corporation's distributor system was
unreasonably anticompetitive and a restraint on trade); Mendelovitz, 693
F.2d at 577 (noting that distributor's refusal to sell Coors beer to a
wholesaler had no anticompetitive effect); Muenster Butane, 651 F.2d at 298
(holding that the restrictions a distributorship imposed on its dealer had no
anticompetitive effect).
,1 See, e.g., Sperry New Holland, 1985 O.J. (L 376) at 22; Johnson &
Johnson, 1980 O.J. (L 377) at 21-25; cf. Ron Tonkin, 637 F.2d at 1388(noting
distributor's decision not to appoint an additional dealer was not plainly
anticompetitive); Quality Mercury, 542 F.2d at 471 (holding that a
franchisee with perpetual veto power over all applications for new
franchises in the area stated a cause of action under the Sherman Act).
,62 See, e.g., Moft et Chandon Ltd., 1982 O.J. (L 94) at 7-9; cf. Assam,
798 F.2d at 318-19 (holding exclusive territories did not violate state
antitrust law after brewery established that it lacked market power); Davis-
Watkins, 686 F.2d at 1202-03 (noting there was insufficient evidence that
a conspiracy or concerted action existed among microwave oven
manufacturers' distributors or dealers to violate the Sherman Act).
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5.3.1. The Miller Case Analyzed With U.S. Insights
The Miller court ruled against the defendant manufacturer
of German records who had imposed export bans on its
distributors in the Netherlands, Alsace-Lorraine and Germany,
but a U.S. judge would have held that those contested
practices were reasonable. Even assuming that intrabrand
competition from Germany to the French province of Alsace-
Lorraine would have flourished in the absence of the export
prohibitions," the relevant clauses of the exclusive
agreement would have been evaluated with regard to the
competitive situation of the relevant market as a whole. Such
non-price intrabrand restrictions alone would never have been
considered per se illegal in a U.S. court.' Moreover,
although the product market would include only records of
light music, which are not interchangeable with records
purchased by different categories of consumers," 5 the
relevant geographic market would not coincide with Germany's
territory. Instead, the market would, at a minimum, comprise
the area where Miller distributors were protected and, hence,
where the effects of the export bans were to be appraised. 6'
The fact that Alsace-Lorraine, with its German-speaking
population, is in a French territory would imply that local
consumers rarely turn to German producers or resellers and
that it is a separate geographic market.
Second, a U.S. judge would examine Miller's power in the
French province. Because Miller's market share in Germany,
where the light music record market is comparatively flooded
by records in German, varied only from 4.91% to 6.07%, it was
'" See Miller, 2 C.M.L.R. at 350-54 (1978). Although no Miller products
were to be exported from Alsace-Lorraine to other countries, a theoretical
possibility for this development infringed Article 85. Miller distributors in
Germany had been active in exporting goods, accounting for 3.25% of the
total German exports in a single year. Id. at 343.
14 Cf. Rutman Wine, 829 F.2d at 735 (noting that the agreement
between a manufacturer and a distributor to establish an exclusive
distributorship is not a per se violation of antitrust laws); Westman, 796
F.2d at 1229 (noting that "the evil to be avoided is the reduction of
interbrand competition.., not the reduction of intrabrand competition").
"' See Miller, [1978]. 2 C.M.L.R. at 343. Cf. Ryko, 823 F.2d at 1231-32
(noting the importance of the prospective entry of new firms in the
definition of the relevant market). See also Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59.
166 See, e.g., Assam, 798 F.2d at 318.
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probably even smaller in Alsace-Lorraine, where a large
number of French records were also sold. A U.S. court would
consider such a market share negligible and therefore hold
that Miller's export bans were reasonable restrictions not in
violation of Article 85(1)." In light of this method of
analysis, there would be no further need to examine whether
export bans were "indispensable" to attain some legitimate
business purpose. Furthermore, assuming the truth of the
Chicago School economic theories, a record producer of a size
similar to Miller would only impose export bans on his German
wholesalers to protect his exclusive distributors in other
territories for good reason. This would also undoubtedly hold
true for distributors in Alsace-Lorraine. Additionally,
distribution costs might be higher in France than in Germany.
Therefore, German resellers not incurring these large costs
could find it profitable to export to Alsace-Lorraine, thereby
free-riding on the investments of the local exclusive
distributor.' Consumers in Alsace-Lorraine would also not
be deprived of the "fair share" of benefits attributed to Miller's
exclusive distribution efforts. Despite the fact that prices for
its products were somehow higher there than in Germany,
'0 Cf. JBL, 698 F.2d at 1017 (holding that minimal manufacturer shares
have little adverse effect on intraband competition); Sandura, 339 F.2d at
852 (holding that closed distribution territories are reasonable when a
manufacturer's market share is 1%). See also Rutman Wine, 829 F.2d at
735 (noting that exclusive distribution arrangements are not per se
violations of antitrust laws); Westman, 796 F.2d at 1225-26 (same); A.H.
Cox, 653 F.2d at 1306 (same).
Other European cases would have an outcome analogous to the one
suggested for Miller. This would probably hold true for Polistil/Arbois, 2
C.M.L.R. at 599, in which the relevant market was highly fragmented, and
the position of the involved manufacturer was weak. On the contrary, no
conclusions may be drawn for decisions whose reasoning includes no
substantial market data. See, e.g., Sperry New Holland, 1985 O.J. (L 376).
Finally, the market situation in some other cases may support the
unreasonableness of the challenged export bans. See Viho, 1992 O.J. (L 233)
at 28 (data redacted to preserve confidentiality); Newitt, 1992 O.J. (L 131)
at 33 (noting the relevant market was oligopolistic, with the top five
manufacturers accounting for almost 90% of all tennis ball sales in the
Community); Tipp-Ex, 1987 O.J. (L 222) at 2 (data redacted to preserve
confidential information).
18 Similar export bans could be considered in Moat et Chandon, 1982
O.J. (L 94) 8-9, because of the tightness of supplies in each of the two
insulated national markets, and in Polistil/Arbois, 1984 O.J. (L 136) at 9-10,
in order to protect the increased investments of local distributors striving
for the revitalization of the sales of their failing supplier's goods.
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these consumers were actually receiving their "fair share" in
the form of non-price efficiencies.
Finally, a U.S. judge scrutinizing the Miller case would also
examine whether the circumstances under which the export
bans were adopted by Miller would support any inferences of
horizontal action among its distributors. Although the current
decision states that Article 85(1) is applicable no matter when
the export bans are adopted,'" this ruling would be different
under U.S. precedent. Pressures from distributors forcefully
demanding that Miller insulate them from intrabrand
competition and parallel imports would probably lead a U.S.
judge to conclude that the export bans were horizontally
imposed and therefore illegal per se. ° There is, however, no
such evidence in Miller. The institution of the bans appears
to be purely vertical, forming part of the manufacturer's
independent distribution strategy.
Such an analysis of the challenged arrangements under
Article 85(1) would benefit Miller, its local distributors, the
ultimate consumers in Alsace-Lorraine and the development
of interstate trade. Promoting Miller's records in a Member
State outside Germany would contribute to the integration of
the European market.
5.3.2. A U.S. Evaluation of the GERO-fabriek Decision
The strong similarities between the prohibition on
horizontal supplies challenged in the GERO-fabriek decision
and the export bans involved in Miller'. may imply that
160 Miller, 2 C.M.L.R. at 350-51.
170 See Big Apple, 974 F.2d at 1379; Red Diamond Supply, 637 F.2d at
1004; American Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1242. The vertical/horizontal
standard might have been applied in Newitt, 1992 O.J. (L 131) at 37-38,
where all direct and indirect measures aimed at the prevention of parallel
imports were taken at the behest of a powerful distributor of the involved
sport goods manufacturer, who was afraid that the former would cease
carrying his products if not protected against intrabrand competition.
Taking into account that the relevant market was also concentrated, and
interbrand competition rather weak, one may assume that implementing the
anticompetitive purposes of the pressuring distributor could be successful.
17 Both practices amount to cross-trade restrictions, although the usual
export bans restrict supplies from traders operating at a given level of
distribution to resellers at the immediately subsequent level or to ultimate
consumers, while horizontal bans restrict supplies between traders at the
same level of distribution. See GERO-fabriek, 1977 O.J. (L 16) at 8-12.
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GERO-fabriek and Miller would have similar outcomes in a
U.S. court. Given that the mere existence of restrictions on
intrabrand competition from one Member State to another
would not be determinative, the analysis would focus on the
effect of the horizontal supplier bans on the competitive
conditions of the relevant market as a whole."" Following
an appropriate definition of the relevant market, which would
include the sale of cutlery in Belgium, a U.S. assessment of the
case would refer to the economic context surrounding the
scrutinized practices. GERO-fabriek, the manufacturer which
prohibited horizontal sales among its dealers, enjoyed only a
15% share of the local Belgian market, where interbrand
competition among the various producers of cutlery was
flourishing. As a result, the imposition of those restrictions
would not be considered to threaten competition or consumer
welfare, and it would not be caught by Article 85(1). 173 Such
a manufacturer would only include "indispensable" clauses in
its dealership agreements. Such clauses would prevent dealers
from countries such as the Netherlands, where distribution
costs and other monetary burdens resulting from different
national conditions (e.g., inflation rates, tax provisions, and
equivalence of national currency) are lower than in other
Member States and where substantially higher -investment
rates are necessary, from horizontally reselling in those high-
priced markets. It could thus take a free ride from the efforts
and expenses of local dealers. Absent evidence that dealer
pressures or threats forced GERO-fabriek to adopt the ban on
horizontal supplies, no per se claims against the ban would be
sustained. A U.S. court could therefore consider the bans
purely vertical and, therefore, reasonable restraints of trade by
focusing on the enhanced performance of Belgian distributors
and of GERO-fabriek in the local Belgian market." The
resulting expansion of the Belgian market would also benefit
the development of a unified European market in which
172 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
173 Cf. Assam, 798 F.2d at 318 (holding that the vertical territorial
practices of a manufacturer with a share of 19.1% were reasonable).
174 See supra note 152. The analysis would be similar in Deutsche
Philips, C.M.L.R. at D243, involving not only bans on horizontal supplies,
but also prohibitions on direct sales from wholesalers to consumers in other
member states. This could have prevented recoupment of the investments
made by local retailers.
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numerous producers operate and compete in all the Member
States.
5.3.3. A U.S. Evaluation of the Grundig-Consten Decision
To suggest that Grundig-Consten, perhaps the most
significant European antitrust case ever, should have been
decided differently is a delicate matter. The following
alternative assessment of the Grundig agreement, however, is
well-founded. A U.S. court would have analyzed this
agreement under the rule of reason customarily applied to
vertical restrictions after Sylvania.' Instead of holding
that such an agreement restricts intrabrand competition and
automatically violates Article 85(1), even if it promotes
interbrand competition (and without regard to the intensity of
intrabrand competition in the relevant market), 7 ' the court
would first have defined this market, computed Grundig's
market share, and then taken into consideration other
economic realities. This redefined product market might
include recorders, dictaphones, and television -sets,
commodities normally not regarded as interchangeable by
consumers. Furthermore, the market would be geographically
tailored to coincide with the territory of France, i.e., the area
shielded against intrabrand competition from Grundig's
foreign resellers. Although there is no reference in the
decisions of the Commission or the Court concerning Grundig's
turnover or total sales in comparison with its interbrand
competitors, the parties' arguments (when the Commission's
decision was appealed) imply that interbrand competition was
vigorous enough to counterbalance the presumed negative
impact of eliminating parallel imports from Germany to
France.7
In addition, the conclusion that Grundig lacked power in
France when it instituted its export bans would make obsolete
any further consideration of the availability of less restrictive
... This approach was explicitly rejected in the Court's decision in
Consten, 1966 E.C.R. at 327, since the balancing considerations usually
made under a rule of reason were believed to be within the exclusive power
of the Commission when applying the third paragraph of Article 85.
176 See id. at 342. See also Grundig-Consten, 1964 J.O. at 2546 (noting
the importance of intrabrand competition and the need to preserve it).
177 See Consten, 1966 E.C.R. at 325.
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alternatives serving the same purposes. Facing competition
from other producers of recorders, dictaphones, and television
sets, Grundig would adopt only the most appropriate,
indispensable means to achieve its business goals. Grundig
could have integrated vertically, setting up a French
subsidiary, as it did in Germany. Vertical integration was not,
however, suitable for a country like France, whose consumers
were highly distrustful of Germans and wished to see Grundig
acquire a French persona before buying its products. 7 ' On
the other hand, Grundig likely decided not to expand
internally in France because it lacked the necessary capital
and the experience to understand the local French market and
to plan accordingly. Once Grundig appointed Consten, an
independent distributor, in France, it had to protect the
latter's territory from German intrusions, in light of the
difference in overhead distribution costs in France and
Germany. The Commission and the Court ignored Grundig's
argument that the difference in pricing was caused by the
difference in expenses incurred by Consten and German
wholesalers." In organizing the Grundig network in
France, Consten bore more expenses than the average German
wholesaler, especially during the start-up phase. Consten had
to finance extensive advertising programs,8 0 purchase and
store large and carefully selected inventories, and pay the
large costs necessary for recruiting an efficient transportation
group that would efficiently distribute Grundig products
throughout the thinly-populated French territory. Of course,
Grundig could have alleviated Consten's expenses by bearing
at least part of the costs itself, but it was financially incapable
of doing so, and it probably wished to avoid the continuous and
costly monitoring of Consten for the successful performance of
178 See Grundig-Consten, 1964 J.O. at 2550; Consten, 1966 E.C.R. at 329.
On the necessity of the institution of export bans versus vertical integration,
see Korah, supra note 24, at 344-45.
17. See Consten, 1966 E.C.R. at 323.
... Advertising in Germany was limited, financed by Grundig itself, and
then charged in the form of higher ex-factory prices to German wholesalers.
In addition, it did not reach the proportions necessary for the French
market. See Consten, 1966 E.C.R. at 331. The guarantee and post-sale
services were also paid by Grundig in France, and thus no free-rider
situations could develop as far as these services were concerned. Id. at 336,
349. See also Grundig-Consten, 1964 J.O. at 2551.
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all the activities it financed. Finally, the assignment to
Consten of the entire French market, excluding the sales of
parallel importers, enabled Consten to plan ahead with
precision, observe the reactions and preferences of French
consumers more closely, and to inform Grundig so that it could
adapt its production accordingly. Parallel importers would, to
a large extent, disturb such monitoring of the French market
and would lead both Consten and Grundig to incorrect
conclusions as to French trends."8 ' It is also reasonable to
infer that if Grundig's strategy had been protected by the E.U.
authorities, French consumers would actually receive their
"fair share" from the benefits derived from the export bans.
They would be able to buy Grundig products from a well-
organized network that provided them with information and
services tailored to their needs.s 2
As for the second practice challenged in the decision, the
use of the additional trademark GINT to impede parallel
imports and thus to enforce the agreed export bans in an
efficient manner, a U.S. court would probably have rejected
the European approach and held that parallel imports in
France actually infringed the GINT trademark. A U.S. judge
would probably have upheld this use of GINT on two grounds:
(1) as an indirect means of enforcing territorial restrictions
otherwise subject to a rule of reason evaluation and found to
be reasonable in this case because of the strong interbrand
competition that Grundig faced in the relevant market;18
and (2) as an independent measure to preserve brand quality,
which must be kept uniform for all products originating from
a single producer. Contrary to what the Commission
stated,'TM the use of only one trademark might have been
insufficient to guarantee that products would be imported to
France and sold to consumers with the same care in handling
... See Grundig-Consten, 1964 J.O. at 2551; Consten, 1966 E.C.R. at 334,
336, 348; see also DeKeyser, supra note 51, at 292-93; Deringer, supra note
51, at 617.
..2 See Grundig-Consten, 1964 J.O. at 2550; Consten, 1966 E.C.R. at 332;
DeKeyser, supra note 51, at 290; Deringer, supra note 51, at 615-16.
' See, e.g., Eastern Scientific, 572 F.2d at 885 (holding that a resale
price maintenance scheme designed to make vertical territorial practices
enforceable is no more restrictive than the latter and should be examined
under the rule of reason).
18 See Grundig-Consten, 1964 J.O. at 2547.
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and high standards set by Grundig by parallel importers as
they would receive from official distributors."
This hypothetical holding would not contradict Article 36
of the Treaty of Rome, which condemns uses of industrial
property rights that disguise trade restrictions among Member
States.18 Such trade might in fact have been prevented
through the challenged export bans and related practices, but
it would have flourished at the manufacturer level such that
Grundig would have the opportunity to expand to France by
selecting the most appropriate measures to achieve this
purpose.
5.3.4. A U.S. Evaluation of the Hennessy-Henkell Decision
One may also predict with relative certainty that a U.S.
court would have held in favor of Hennessy in the Hennessy-
Henkell decision involving control of prices that discouraged
parallel imports into Germany, where Henkell had exclusively
undertaken the distribution of Hennessy's products. Despite
the per se illegality of resale price maintenance, which is
generally accepted by both the United States and the
European Union, the Hennessy price-regulating scheme would
only have been considered a means of furthering vertical
territorial restrictions." 7  Hennessy was an alcoholic
beverage producer that accounted for only 16% of the French
cognac market, the site of its principal operations, and
presumably for an even smaller percentage of other relevant
markets such as Germany, where Henkell had absolute
territorial protection.' The fact that Henkell enjoyed only
a small market share and faced competition from German
spirits would not allow it to protect Hennessy's territory for
18 See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1988)
(holding in a slightly different context than Grundig that the importation
of foreign-made goods in the United States, where the United States
trademark owner had authorized the use of the mark in the foreign country,
should be prohibited). Of course, the K Mart case involved goods
manufactured abroad, even if with the consent of the trademark owner,
which perhaps varied in quality from their U.S. counterparts. See id. at
292-94. It is possible, however, that Grundig was aiming to preserve quality
as well.
186 Treaty of Rome, art. 36.
187 See Eastern Scientific, 572 F.2d at 885.
18 See Hennessy-Henkell, 1980 O.J. (L 383) at 11.
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plainly anticompetitive purposes. Clauses 5.4 and 6 of the
exclusive agreement with Henkell could only protect Henkell's
investments against parallel importers and allow it to reap the
fruits of its efforts. At the same time, it is not evident from
the facts of the case that Hennessy unwillingly controlled
prices at Henkell's request to enable it to extract
supracompetitive profits.' If the case had been decided
according to U.S. standards, the outcome would reflect that the
arrangement was advantageous for German consumers and
recognize the output-enhancing effects of the contested
scheme."9
5.3.5. Distillers Reconsidered
Although the Commission's decision in Distillers verified
the marked hostility of E.U. officials to direct or indirect
practices preventing parallel imports, its repercussions
demonstrated that export bans and other indirect devices
curtailing parallel trade may actually benefit manufacturers,
distributors, consumers and European market integration in
the long run. Distillers, a group of companies producing
alcoholic spirits and charging higher prices to English
wholesalers wishing to export to the continent rather than to
resell locally, reacted when the Commission refused to exempt
its practices under Article 85(3) by totally withdrawing its
products from the continental European countries, thus cutting
off much of the European Union from the advantages of
interstate trade. 19'
A U.S. court would have viewed the situation from a
different perspective. Distillers' products were generally
unknown on the continent but were well established in
England, where they enjoyed the favor of a substantial number
of local consumers.' 92 Their minimal share in the relevant
199 See KORAH & ROTHNIE, supra note 27; Schriter, supra note 28; text
accompanying note 134.
See also Deutsche Philips, 1973 O.J. (L 293) at 40; Du Pont de
Nemours, 1973 O.J. (L 194) at 27. In both cases, the hypothetical outcome
under the rule of reason would be analogous to the outcome in Hennessy-
Henkell.
191 See Korah, supra note 58, at 68-69.
.9. See Chard, supra note 1, at 430. The market shares of Distillers in
continental Europe were similar to those of some manufacturers challenged
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markets of the Member States on the continent would preclude
any inferences of manipulating dual pricing for anticompetitive
purposes. Distillers' scheme was nothing but "indispensable."
Sole distributors on the continent had to bear high promotion
costs while their equivalents in the United Kingdom had no
comparable expenses. The continental consumers were loyal
to national brands in their countries, and as a result, only
intense advertising would make them shift to the Distillers'
products, particularly because discriminatory taxes favoring
local spirits imposed by some national governments on Scotch
whiskey made Distillers' price even higher in those states. 9 '
The different prices charged by Distillers according to product
destination were therefore not set arbitrarily, and they did not
amount to price discrimination responding to the difference in
elasticities of demand between continental Europe and the
United Kingdom. The price differences were simply due to the
higher costs of promotion incurred by the sole distributors on
the continent. These distributors would have faced serious
free-rider problems in their territories but for the adoption of
the dual pricing scheme.' On the other hand, the need for
dual pricing may have also been supported by the lack of
alternatives open to Distillers to achieve the same goal.
Vertical integration would have been far too costly and would
have prevented Distillers from taking advantage of the sole
distributors' core competencies and their knowledge of the
local markets. Likewise, Distillers' assumption of the
promotion costs might have resulted in their selling at a loss
on the continent. Similarly, the standardization of all prices
at a higher level for the entire European Union would have
forced consumers in the United Kingdom to shift to lower-
for their vertical territorial practices in the United States. See, e.g., JBL,
698 F.2d at 1017; Sandura, 339 F.2d at 852. In other cases involving dual
pricing schemes, however, manufacturers were powerful and faced only
limited interbrand competition. See, e.g., Newitt, 1992 O.J. (L 131) at 33-35.
'g' See, e.g., Distillers, 1978 O.J. (L 50) at 23.
194 See id. at 23. See also Van Bael, supra note 1, at 46-47, and Borden
Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967), on the distinction
between mere price differentials and price discrimination. The
manufacturer in Borden was selling a premium brand at higher prices than
its non-premium brand, but this differential reflected the heavy advertising
costs that it incurred for the promotion of the premium brand. Id., 381 F.2d
at 180 n.17.
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priced brands. Thus, there were no viable alternatives.195
Using a U.S. standard to analyze the circumstances would
mean taking into consideration that ultimate consumers on the
continent would receive a "fair share" of benefit because the
contested dual pricing scheme enabled them to have access to
a well-advertised .good, thus considerably broadening their
freedom of selection among competing spirit brands.'
5.3.6. Hasselblad Revisited
If the E.U. officials in Miller, GERO-fabriek, Grundig-
Consten, Hennessy-Henkell and Distillers were dealing with
manufacturers enjoying small market shares who protected
their exclusive distributors from free-riders because they had
no other effective means to implement the successful
distribution of their products, it is far less clear that this was
the case in Hasselblad. Camera Care, a price-active dealer
who carried Hasselblad's goods imported from Member States,
where they were sold at lower prices, was excluded through
the use of a selective distribution system. At first glance, this
act might be interpreted as a device designed to enforce a
vertical territorial scheme. Hasselblad could have sought to
protect its full-price sole distributors and dealers from
competition, as only they would be willing to provide an
adequate level of service for its complex product, professional
single lens reflex cameras. This control of the price
mechanism has often been used to prevent intrabrand
competition from country to country.197 Alternatively, this
policy may also be characterized as wholly unilateral,
originating from the manufacturer itself, which, after being
notified that parallel imports are occurring, recommends that
its national sole distributors take the necessary measures to
monitor sales by Hasselblad dealers operating in their
... On the existence of less restrictive alternatives than dual pricing, see
Distillers, 1978 O.J. (L 50) at 28-29, and Van Bael, supra note 1, at 49.
I" But see Sharpe, supra note 58, at 458 (focusing on the need to
preserve price competition between European distributors and parallel
importers).
197 See Eastern Scientific, 572 F.2d at 884-85. The territorial restrictions
may have been necessary because national currency fluctuations made cross-
sales profitable to parallel importers. See Hasselblad, 1982 O.J. (L 161) at
20, on appeal, 1984 E.C.R. at 887.
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respective territories.
A U.S. court, however, would have ruled differently.
Defining the product market to include only the type of
professional cameras sold by Hasselblad, as the European
Court did, and limiting the geographic market to the United
Kingdom, a U.S. court would have found that the sales of
Hasselblad cameras accounted for an overwhelming percentage
of the local market."' 8 Such market power may give a
manufacturer the opportunity not only to use territorial
restrictions to insulate markets and discriminate in prices but
also to further several anticompetitive purposes. In the
Hasselblad context, a U.S. judge could also apply the multiple
horizontal conspiracy standards.19 Several sole distributors
whose territories had been "invaded" by parallel importers
communicated among themselves0 0 and complained to their
common supplier,0 1 which instituted a new policy in
response. Dealers buying at low prices from parallel importers
would be cut off from the distribution network, and
distributors could exchange price lists to fix their prices and
avoid intrabrand competition.0 2 By themselves, complaints
by distributors would be considered immaterial by a U.S.
court, as those complaints are often useful only in conveying
information to a manufacturer concerned about the
organization of its distribution network. Combined with the
communication among distributors and the exchange of price
lists, however, they would be considered suspicious. If
distributors can adjust their prices at any time to combat
parallel imports, their original high prices are due not to
increased promotion costs or other monetary burdens but
198 Hasselblad estimated its share in England at 25%, based on a far
broader product market definition. The delineation of a narrower product
market, distinguishing between Hasselblad medium format reflex cameras
and other professional cameras on the basis of format, quality of
reproduction, handling and range of accessories, would have led a court to
conclude that Hasselblad enjoyed a much larger market share than
estimated. In analogous cases, vertical territorial arrangements blocking
cross-sales have been held unreasonable by U.S. courts. See, e.g., Graphic,
717 F.2d at 1569-70.
199 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
200 See Hasselblad, 1984 E.C.R. at 893.
201 See Hasselblad, 1982 O.J. (L 161) at 20.
202 Id. at 23, 33.
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rather to supracompetitive profits. An exchange of lists may
also lead to increased fixed distributor prices in the long run.
5.3.7. The Limitation of Guarantees in ETA Under the U.S.
Lens
Finally, in ETA203 the absolute territorial protection of
the national sole distributors of a brand of inexpensive
watches was achieved through the supplier's denial of watches
to honor the guarantee rights of consumers who had purchased
such watches from parallel importers. This practice would be
assessed by a U.S. court under the rule of reason, which is
applicable to all vertical territorial schemes. After
appropriately defining the relevant market, ETA's market
share, and other market conditions, a U.S. court would have
ruled based on the reasonableness of the restrictions. Absent
market power or other adverse market conditions, claims
against the contested practice would be dismissed. A
limitation of guarantees may therefore only further the
competitiveness-enhancing purposes of a manufacturer. If
watches were not sold under guarantee to parallel importers
and were not given guarantee service, it was probably because
ETA could not monitor whether the watches had reached the
ultimate consumers in perfect condition without observing
their maximum storage period.2
6. CONCLUSION
The proposal made in this Article, although inspired by
U.S. antitrust theory and practice, which focuses on the need
to consider legitimate all efficiency-enhancing vertical
territorial schemes that do not result in consumer welfare
impairments, is also in conformity with the basic goals and
characteristics of E.U. competition law. First, it is designed to
foster, not prevent, the unification of the European market. At
the same time, the evaluation of intense vertical territorial
intrabrand restrictions according to a market structure
analysis guarantees that the latter will not serve predatory
203 Case 31/85, ETA Fabriques D'Ebauches S.A. v. DK Investment, 1985
E.C.R. 3933, 2 C.M.L.R. 674 (1986).
2*4 See id., 2 C.M.L.R. at 677.
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behavior, price-discrimination or other manufacturer practices,
which artificially preserve trade barriers among national
territories. The per se condemnation of distributor cartels and
other similarly manipulative activities disguised as innocent
vertical schemes also ensures that the European market will
not remain segregated due to colluding distributors. Second,
the traditional central enforcement role of the Commission
would not be disturbed by assigning new duties to national
courts, which will follow the application of the proposed model.
By retaining the discretion to consult with courts during the
first steps of the implementation of the proposal, the
Commission could then dedicate its resources to the scrutiny
of truly dangerous schemes of absolute territorial protection
and other collusive activities. Third, the proposal respects the
current bifurcated structure of Article 85. Although it
introduces a rather narrow scope for its first paragraph, which
would require use of a rule of reason and market power
considerations, it suggests reforms only to the extent necessary
to avoid inefficient results. Fourth, using a market structure
filter approach, the proposal recognizes the economic realities
prevalent in the European market. Since the market is
already characterized by concentration, entry and exit
barriers, and limited mobility, only vertical territorial
restrictions that raise minimal or absolutely no
anticompetitive concerns would be protected.
On the other hand, as is apparent from the application of
the proposed approaches in specific situations already faced by
the E.U. antitrust authorities, the intervention of the
Commission under the third paragraph of Article 85 would
rarely be required. In most cases, national courts could apply
the U.S. rule of reason, disposing of antitrust claims against
vertical territorial restraints under 85(1). It seems, however,
that it will take some time before such practices earn the
sympathy of E.U. officials. In spite of a limited number of
European decisions, mainly originating from the Court of
Justice, and considering them exemptible under 85(3),205 an
2. See, e.g., Pronuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 353. In Pronuptia, absolute
territorial protection was held exemptible only under Article 85(3) and only
during the start-up phase of a trader's operation. On the other hand, the
Court of First Instance has taken a negative stance against any impediment
of parallel imports, thus perpetuating the already demonstrated hostility of
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avalanche of precedents point to the opposite result. Until the
voices of commentators are heard and a sufficient degree of
economic realism is displayed in the reasoning of European
decisions, only amendment of the existing regulation on
exclusive distribution can remedy the weaknesses of the
current case law.
the Commission and the Court of Justice. See, e.g., Case T-23/90 R
Automobile Peugeot v. Comm'n, 1990 E.C.R. 195, 4 C.M.L.R. 674 (Ct. First
Instance 1990). See also Ivo Van Bael, Insufficient Judicial Control of EC
Competition Law Enforcement, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 733, 742
(1993); Marc van der Woude, The Court of First Instance: The First Three
Years, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 621, 638 (1993). For a general
appraisal of the role of economics in E.U. competition enforcement, see
Donald L. Holley, E.E.C. Competition Practice: A Thirty-Year Retrospective,
1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 669, 717 (1993).
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